High Stakes of Media Messages: Decoding Visual Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses by Liese, Jennifer
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
5-1-2014
High Stakes of Media Messages: Decoding Visual
Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British
Presses
Jennifer Liese
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, liesej@unlv.nevada.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Broadcast and Video Studies Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, and the Mass
Communication Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations,
Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Liese, Jennifer, "High Stakes of Media Messages: Decoding Visual Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses" (2014).
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 2115.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/2115
  
HIGH STAKES OF MEDIA MESSAGES: 
DECODING VISUAL NARRATIVES FROM THE IRAQ WAR IN THE U.S. AND 
BRITISH PRESSES  
 
By 
Jennifer Liese 
 
Bachelor of Science, Anthropology/Sociology 
Towson University  
2004 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the 
 
Master of Arts - Journalism and Media Studies 
 
Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies 
Greenspun College of Urban Affairs 
The Graduate College 
 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
May 2014 
 
  
	  
	  
ii	  
  
 
THE GRADUATE COLLEGE 
We recommend the thesis prepared under our supervision by  
Jennifer Liese 
entitled  
High Stakes of Media Messages: Decoding Visual Narratives from the 
Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses 
is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts - Journalism and Media Studies 
Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies  
 
 
Gregory Borchard, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
Paul Traudt, Ph.D., Committee Member 
Gary Larson, Ph.D., Committee Member 
Dennis Pirages, Ph.D., Graduate College Representative 
Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D., Interim Dean of the Graduate College 
 
May 2014 
 
 
 
	  
	  
iii	  
 
ABSTRACT 
High Stakes of Media Messages: 
Decoding Visual Narratives from the Iraq War in the U.S. and British Presses 
by 
Jennifer Liese 
Dr. Gregory Borchard, Examination Committee Chair 
Graduate Coordinator, Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
This research analyzes media coverage of the Iraq War from the perspective of 
the invading forces, the United States and the United Kingdom. The New York Times and 
The Guardian were chosen to represent news from their respective countries because of 
their high circulation rates and international prestige for journalistic reporting. The study 
focuses on how the Iraq War was visually represented after the Iraq invasion of 2003, 
examining periods in 2006 and 2011. There were significant differences in how The New 
York Times and The Guardian visually portrayed the war in 2006, especially in terms of 
Iraqi civilian and Coalition military casualties. However, there were no significant 
differences in how they represented the war visually in 2011. War is a high-stakes 
enterprise and how messages are broadcast visually, verbally, and textually influence the 
audience’s perception of the war. With the use of similar and repeated images 
encouraging support or opposition to military conflict, these messages become more 
salient for the audience. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the current information age of minute-by-minute media updates, audiences are 
inundated with global and local news coverage, which sometimes confuses their 
understanding of important international events, such as war. The information individuals 
consume from print, television, and online media play a major part in informing 
individual perspectives and constructing societal realities about the world around them. 
Many scholars have studied how various media outlets report and portray war on varying 
platforms and countries (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 
2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Wells, 2007). Recently, much attention has been given to 
how the Iraq War was covered visually and textually (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 
2007; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; King, & Lester, 2005; Wells, 2007). 
The Iraq War lasted more than eight years, resulting in the deaths of 4,500 
Americans, and cost somewhere between $800 billion and $3 trillion (Ghosh, 2012). Iraqi 
casualties have been estimated anywhere from 100,000 to 600,000 people (Ghosh, 2012) 
with some estimates as high as a million. With continued war efforts in Afghanistan and 
the U.S. involvement in Libya, Syria, and Egypt, awareness of message frames and 
critical consumption of media will remain an integral component in keeping the public 
informed and conscientious about foreign policy issues. 
In constructing news, journalists rely on newsgathering practices and credible 
sources to express large concepts, explain the facts, structure the headlines, and write the 
storyline (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003). How journalists choose to report and cover events 
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are influenced by how similar events have been reported and documented in the past. 
Often conventional news frames are reiterated creating “persistent patterns of selection, 
emphasis, and exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events” 
(Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 4). How news is presented — particularly military conflict 
— is influenced by complex relationships between political pressures, government-media 
negotiations, military censorship, internal media politics, and profit. A number of 
scholars have discussed the difficulties of collecting and publishing verifiable and 
meaningful stories under wartime conditions (Jamail, 2011; Fuchs, 2011; Schechter, 
2011). 
Accordingly, scholars and policy analysts have devoted much attention to 
studying media messages and their role in reporting the Iraq War, as well as in their 
portrayal of the war through visual frames and narratives (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; 
Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). Essentially, during times of war, as 
scholars have noted, visuals create persuasive messages that develop public support for 
the actions of the government and military (Fahmy & Wanta, 2007, p. 20). How media 
outlets reported the Iraq War has been debated and analyzed in several studies (Dimitrova 
& Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; King, & 
Lester, 2005; Wells, 2007). 
Within a democratic society, the importance of reputable, independent and 
balanced news sources are paramount in educating the general populace. This is essential 
in providing individuals accurate information when evaluating candidates for public 
office and in deciding what policy issues to support or oppose — including foreign 
conflict. The democratic process cannot exist without members of the Fourth Estate who 
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practice independently and critically. In The Press and Foreign Policy, Cohen writes, 
“the media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p .13). 
Entman (2007) built upon Cohen’s concepts, suggesting scholars need to address the 
larger implications of media framing. “If the patterns of slant persist across time, message 
dimensions, and media outlets,” he wrote, “it means that the media may be systematically 
assisting certain entities to induce their preferred behavior in others” (Entman, 2007, p. 
166). This is especially important within the context of media’s portrayal of war. 
Two years into the Iraq invasion, Air Force General Erwin Lessel addressed the 
importance of aligning public opinion with the government’s position for policy makers. 
General Lessel explained the government focuses on public perceptions and public 
information within the United States. “That support, that information, is necessary,” he 
wrote. ”You can’t fight a war; you can’t go forth successfully, without popular U.S. 
support” (McCormick Tribune, 2005, p. 109). However, in order to maintain a self-
governing democracy, it is imperative that the populace is educated. James Madison 
made this point early in the nation’s formation when he wrote, “A popular Government, 
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or 
a Tragedy; or, perhaps both” (Madison, 1822, p. 103). Geoffrey Stone, professor of law at 
the University of Chicago, reiterates Madison’s sentiment in his explanation for the 
necessity and importance of the First Amendment and the difficulties of its application in 
wartime. “In a self-governing democracy, it is fundamental that citizens openly discuss 
policy and debate freely who their leaders should be,” Stone wrote. “And there is no issue 
more important than whether and how to go to war” (McCormick Tribune, 2005, p. 14). 
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Media messages supporting or opposing the Iraq War have varied significantly 
between media platforms and countries, with a number of these studies focusing on 
pictorial representations of key events (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-
Ahern, 2007; Wells, 2007). War is a “high-stakes enterprise” and every war includes 
competing images and messages to influence public perceptions (Griffin, 2010). While 
previous studies have completed comparative analyses of news images during the Iraq 
invasion in 2003, this thesis includes images and messages from the occupation, and the 
official end of the Iraq War in 2011. A comprehensive analysis of news from the United 
States and the United Kingdom during this period provides a better understanding of the 
complex relationships between government, public interest, and the press. 
 
Background 
The ability of photographs to capture and bear witness to moments in time have 
captivated audiences and influenced history. Images published or broadcast with news 
stories play a major role in affecting media frames and messages (Sontag, 2003; Fahmy 
& Kim, 2008; Wells, 2007). Since photography’s inception, the new medium was 
heralded “the ultimate eyewitness, unhampered by subjectivity, memory lapses, or flights 
of fancy” (Goldberg, 1991, p. 19). Today, when audiences are aware of the ability to 
manipulate images, sophisticated observers often tend to believe unconsciously the 
camera’s report (Goldberg, 1991). 
The “juxtaposition and integration” of other images and text can further alter 
visual meanings (Roskill & Carrier, 1983, p. 19). Therefore, awareness of image 
manipulation and the marketing of messages will help audiences be less susceptible to 
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coercive visual frames (Messaris, 1994). Sontag (2003) addressed this phenomenon in 
her analysis of how photographs are not simply transparencies of what happened. They 
are “the image that someone chose; to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to exclude” 
(Sontag, 2003, p. 46). War photography initially was intended to “drum up support” for 
soldiers and their sacrifices (Sontag, 2003, p. 48). The manipulation of photographs and 
war staging goes back to Civil War photography. Common at the time of Mathew 
Brady’s Civil War photography was the staging of dead bodies for dramatic effect 
(Borchard, Mullen & Bates, 2013). “To photograph was to compose (with living subjects, 
to pose), and the desire to arrange elements in the picture did not vanish because the 
subject was immobilized, or immobile” (Sontag, 2003, p. 53). 
Scholars continue to cite Entman’s (1993) definition of framing (Fahmy & Kim, 
2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Entman (1993) was particularly interested in 
how framing influences the perceptions and thoughts of audiences (p. 51). To frame, he 
wrote, “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Frames “define problems,” “diagnose 
causes,” “make moral judgments,” and “suggest remedies” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). 
Frames call attention to some aspects of reality, but they also obscure others (Entman, 
1993, p. 55). Framing plays a significant role in the exertion of power, and “the frame in 
a news text is really the imprint of power — it registers the identity of actors or interests 
that competed to dominate the text” (Entman, 1993, p. 55). 
However, discussing and applying the terms of frames and framing to visual 
images can be problematic. In photography, framing can mean how the subject is 
contained within the physical borders of the image, the choice of subject, and the 
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intention to represent meaning through the image. In communication studies, the concept 
of framing can refer to text, images, and rhetoric and it refers to how messages are 
articulated and received (Entman, 1993). Clearly defining concepts and terms utilized 
within academic literature is necessary in communicating complex and multifaceted 
topics. 
This study will provide a necessary contribution to the scholarship that has not 
previously addressed the roles of major newspapers in communicating international 
events. The New York Times and The Guardian are among the world’s most respected 
newspapers (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). The Sunday edition of The New York Times ranks 
first in the nation for the largest circulation rates, and the daily newspaper holds the 
second-largest circulation rates (Haughney, 2013). The Guardian’s print and online 
versions have been utilized by previous researchers studying media coverage of the Iraq 
war from the United Kingdom (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 
2007; Wells, 2007). Similarly, previous researchers have also used The New York Times 
to analyze and represent media coverage of the Iraq war from the United States (Fahmy 
& Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Moreover, both The Times and The 
Guardian have secured their places in research as among the most cited newspaper 
sources for conducting analyses on international media events. 
 
Thematic Statement 
Scholars have documented how photographs that illustrate messages and frame 
news have influenced audiences. War images have the ability to persuade, provoke, 
inspire, influence, compel change, and reinforce nationalistic causes. This thesis provides 
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a comparative analysis of war frames over the course of a conflict, from invasion to 
official end. To analyze contemporary war reporting, the thesis examines the recent 
conflict between American forces and the counterinsurgency in Iraq. The thesis analyzes 
the newspapers of the invading forces, namely The New York Times and The Guardian, 
two newspapers chosen for their journalistic quality and international prestige. Both 
papers are politically independent, but considered left leaning in political stance and 
journalistic viewpoints. The Times is among the few family owned and operated major 
newspapers still publishing in the United States. The Guardian Media Group, a trust that 
exists in part to secure the financial and editorial independence of The Guardian, owns 
the newspaper, which was founded by textile traders and merchants as “an organ of the 
middle class” (Engels, 1973, p. 109). Given their statuses as independent newspapers, 
both with important perspectives on international issues, previous scholars have utilized 
The New York Times and The Guardian to represent journalistic reporting from the 
United States and the United Kingdom (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-
Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). “Both of these prestigious newspapers fall 
into the same liberal model … as they tend to hold more liberal viewpoints in comparison 
with other newspapers in their country” (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 448). 
The United States and the United Kingdom are both major powers in the 
international world and had similar stakes in the Iraq War, and previous studies have 
found many similarities and some differences between their published war images 
(Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). For this thesis, a content 
analysis of published Iraq War images from The New York Times and The Guardian was 
developed through the examination of images, headlines, and photographic captions. This 
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thesis compares the same historic events in both publications, which include the 
occupation period in 2006, and the close of the war in 2011. Additionally, the thesis 
investigates how the British press and the American press relayed these events in their 
photographic news coverage. The research examines ongoing or changing war 
frames/narratives within each publication, as well as how The New York Times and The 
Guardian’s coverage compared to each other. In providing a longitudinal study of the 
Iraq War, this research analyzes complex issues including the purpose of the war, the 
success/status of the war, and the impact/future implications of the war as relayed 
through the lens of media. 
 
Significance of the Study 
The ways in which messages are broadcast visually, verbally, and textually 
influence the audience’s perception of events. With the use of similar and repeated 
images juxtaposed with text, these messages become more salient for the audience. Much 
attention has been given to media messages and their role in supporting or opposing the 
Iraq War through frames and narratives, which has varied significantly between media 
platforms and countries (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern, 2007; 
Wells, 2007). After all, foreign policy news is closely related to security issues; therefore, 
international events are often framed in a matter that is consistent to the host country’s 
government interests. 
While previous studies have provided comparative analyses of news images 
during the Iraq invasion in 2003, this thesis contributes to scholarly research by including 
images and messages from the occupation, and the official end of the Iraq War in 2011. 
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The daily newspapers of the U.S.’s The New York Times and the U.K.’s The Guardian 
were analyzed for this study. Daily newspapers rather than weekly magazines were 
chosen for this research in order to get an immediate interpretation of events, one that is 
more commonly used by consumers of news, as well as media outlets, including websites 
and broadcasters. By examining disparate media coverage of war, this thesis develops 
new scholarship on framing analysis. 
 
Literature Review 
Several scholars have examined the visual coverage of military conflicts in the 
Middle East over the last twenty-two years. A few different types of studies have 
emerged. Some scholars have provided a historical analysis of war reporting within a 
country (King & Lester, 2005; Griffin, 1995, 2004). Other researchers have focused on 
war reporting within a single country during an event or short duration of time (Keith, 
Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2009; Wells, 2007). Finally, other studies have compared the 
reporting of military conflict between countries (Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & 
Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). Within all these studies, several 
techniques of visual and textual analysis have been conducted, highlighting varying 
degrees of success and shortcomings. 
King and Lester (2005) conducted a historical content analysis of photographic 
images from the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. The authors compared 
the differences in the visual coverage from the media pool system used in 1991 to the use 
of embedded journalists in 2003. Journalists chosen to make up the military press pool 
was highly selective at about 100 individuals, with a pool of sixteen reporters covering 
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every ground unit of over 500,000 troops (King & Lester, 2005). Also, in 1991 all stories 
and images required military approval and were subject to censorship (King & Lester, 
2005). During the 2003 Iraq War, more than 500 embedded journalists were trained by 
military officials and traveled with coalition combat units (King & Lester, 2005). While 
the embedded journalists in 2003 were subject to less restrictive practices than the 1991 
reporters, many argued because the embedded reporters are so dependent on the soldiers 
for safety—they would be more likely to identify with them and report stories that are 
more favorable about the soldiers and the war (King & Lester, 2005). 
The first week of the start of the ground war in 1991 and 2003 were compared on 
microfilm for the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, and the New York Times 
(King & Lester, 2005). From the two periods, 1,023 photographs were analyzed, 317 for 
1991 and 706 for 2003 (King & Lester, 2005). There were statistically significant 
differences in content categories between 1991 and 2003. The 2003 conflict contained 
more fighting scenes, and protestor images. The 1991 war had a larger proportion of 
battlefield scenes, prisoners, and civilian images and portraits. The ratio of images for 
deceased soldiers, injured soldiers, and miscellaneous pictures for both wars was similar. 
Significant differences were also found on page selection, the 1991 war had almost twice 
as many front-page images than the 2003 conflict. The authors found the combined 
categories of battle scenes similar for both wars. The authors concluded the embedding 
program resulted in a much larger frequency of published war images in 2003 over 1991; 
however, allowing journalists better access to war zones “may not automatically result in 
more direct war coverage” (King & Lester, 2005). 
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Griffin (2004) analyzed the U.S. news-magazine photo coverage of the “War on 
Terrorism” in Afghanistan and the Iraq invasion (p. 381). Griffin utilized the same 
photographic methods of classifying images into frames as his earlier study of the 1991 
Persian Gulf War. In the earlier study of the Gulf War, Griffin and Lee (1995) found little 
attention was given to actual combat, civilian casualties, or cultural damage. Instead, 57 
percent of all pictures published in news magazines consisted of images of the American 
arsenal (planes, ships, tanks, missiles, and other weapons), troops (not in combat), and 
pictures of political and military leaders (Griffin & Lee, 1995). The central theme of the 
pictorial representation promoted the power and superiority of the American military, 
while neglecting the human cost or cultural contexts of the conflict (Griffin & Lee, 1995). 
Then in Griffin’s (2004) study, images of the 2003 invasion of Iraq were found to 
be similar to the (1995) study of the Persian Gulf War. About half of all photographs 
printed in U.S. news magazines were of the arsenal, unengaged troops, and political 
leaders (Griffin, 2004). Also, as a result of embedded journalists with U.S. troops, new 
categories of images occurred that were not available from the previous Persian Gulf 
War. For example, there were numerous photographs of Iraqis. The majority of these 
photographs could be categorized as either pictures of Iraqi civilians greeting American 
armored convoys, images of Kurdish fighters allied with U.S. and British forces, pictures 
of captured Iraqi soldiers, photographs of Iraqis receiving humanitarian aid, or pictures of 
crowds cheering U.S. troops (Griffin, 2004). As in 1991, categories of images that were 
absent included pictures of coalition casualties (U.S. and British), damage of Iraq 
bombing and war, and pictures of the Iraqi perspective (Griffin, 2004). 
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The overall narrative of the 2003 invasion was “Rolling to Baghdad,” which 
depicted the unstoppable military machine of the United States and culminated in Iraqi 
liberation by the toppling of the Saddam regime and the destruction of Saddam’s statue 
(Griffin, 2004). Griffin (2004) discussed how the ongoing conflict following the end of 
the invasion confused American media’s coverage of this war. As a result, Griffin (2004) 
discussed how published war images had dropped significantly, and argued a new 
narrative of the conflict had yet to emerge. 
Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009) applied Griffin and Lee’s (1995) methods 
and found similar results in their analysis of images from the 2003 Iraq invasion. The 
authors compared the visual content produced from print, television, and online media 
coverage during the first five weeks of the 2003 Iraq invasion. In their content analysis of 
1,822 war related images of the invasion of Iraq, researchers found little difference 
between the most prevalent war frames (Keith, et al., 2009). Keith, et al., found 77 
percent of the most dominant images collected of the invasion were of the arsenal/war 
machine. The authors noted finding similar results to Griffin’s (2004) news magazine 
study. The enemy received scant visual coverage among these three platforms, as did 
Iraqi civilians, scenes of actual combat, or casualties. 
Keith, et al., (2009) recognized limitations of their research, stating the data 
collected only reflected differences during specific times and could not be generalized to 
overall image selection by television, Internet, or print media. Also, it is important to note 
the authors started their study with Griffin and Lee’s twenty-seven classifications of war 
images, which they then shrunk into six categories and, in statistical analyses, further 
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reduced to only three categories. Due to the sample size chosen, Keith, et al., (2009) 
seemed to have only scratched the surface on analyzing these war images. 
Fahmy and Kim (2008) also applied Griffin and Lee’s (1995) methods in their 
visual study of the 2003 Iraq War in the American and British presses. The authors chose 
to compare The New York Times and Britain’s The Guardian because both of these 
newspapers tend to be more liberal and are respected worldwide for their journalism 
(Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 448). Fahmy and Kim coded 1,099 photographs from The New 
York Times and 206 photographs from The Guardian and found coverage of the Iraq War 
was extremely narrow, with a focus on images of Allied troops and U.S. and British 
political leaders in both newspapers. However, there were significant differences between 
the press coverage. The New York Times predominantly printed images of coalition 
troops (23.9 percent); then loss of civilian life in Iraq (21.2 percent); images of leaders 
from the United States and Great Britain (6.4 percent); and coalition troops with Iraqi 
civilians (6.1 percent) (Fahmy & Kim, 2008, p. 451). The majority of The Guardian’s 
images were loss of civilian life in Iraq (20 percent); then Allied troops (11.7 percent); 
and images of looters, presidential palaces, and artifacts in Iraq (10.3 percent). 
The analysis revealed the British newspaper was more concerned with the 
disturbance of cultural sites in Iraq because of looting and war. Also, The New York 
Times printed fewer images of casualties and destruction (17.3 percent) in comparison to 
The Guardian (35.5 percent) (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Contrary to expectations, both 
newspapers showed more images of Iraqi civilian casualties in comparison to images of 
military fatalities. 
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The British newspaper ran fewer photographs of political leaders from the United 
States and Great Britain. These papers also provided fewer images of “happy encounters” 
between troops and Iraqi civilians (than the U.S. media), and they printed more images of 
looting and cultural artifact loss. Also, unlike The New York Times, The Guardian printed 
actual combat images. Fahmy and Kim (2008) discussed how the majority of the British 
public opposed the war while the American public was largely in favor of it; therefore, 
the U.S. media may have represented the news in a more patriotic framework to meet the 
expectations of readers, while British coverage of the invasion was more critical. 
The research was organized. It provided adequate discussion of previous research 
and clearly defined terms/concepts used in the study. However, the ratio of photographs 
analyzed in the two newspapers should have been more proportional. With thirty-six 
categories for analysis, 1,099 photographs from The New York Times provide an 
overview for cursory purposes. However, the study’s analysis of only 206 photographs 
from The Guardian in these thirty-six categories does not provide significant statistical 
data. 
Other scholars have constructed original frameworks for coding media war 
images (Wells, 2007; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007), and others have narrowed 
their focus to study published war images of children (Thorne, 2003; Wells 2007). 
Thorne (2003) examined photographs published from the 2003 Iraq invasion in U.S. 
news, European media, and Middle Eastern outlets. The author found photographs of 
severely wounded children were rare in U.S. news, more prominent in European media, 
and most prevalent in Middle Eastern media (Thorne, 2003). Thorne (2003) discussed the 
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power of representing suffering children to “personify injustice” because “children 
signify vulnerability, dependence, and innocence” (p. 261). 
Wells (2007) focused on published photographs of children in British newspapers 
during the Iraq invasion. The author discussed how images of children are particularly 
influential when framing motivations and outcomes of war. Wells (2007) argued 
oppositional visual narratives of the Iraq invasion existed in the Daily Mirror, and The 
Guardian. These two narratives were: 1) Anti-war sentiments and expressions about the 
illegality of the Iraq invasion (the Daily Mirror); and, 2) Skepticism of the legality of war 
with liberation narratives (The Guardian). 
To justify these different narratives the author displayed four published images, 
discussed a few images not shown, and presented a sample of headlines. Wells (2007) 
found The Guardian, although opposed to the Iraq war, did anticipate a favorable 
outcome for the Iraqi people. This was revealed through images selected from The 
Guardian, such as Iraqi children celebrating the fall of Saddam, smiling Iraqi children 
with a British Marine, and happy Iraqi children on top of an abandoned Iraqi tank. 
In contrast, the Daily Mirror focused on the illegality of the invasion of Iraq and 
the suffering of the Iraqi people/children. The author discussed how the Daily Mirror 
printed many of the same images as the Arab press and often included wide-angle shots 
of damage resulting from the war (Wells, 2007, p. 69). Wells (2007) asserted the images 
printed by the Daily Mirror were intended to expose the actions of the British 
government and question the legalities of the Iraq invasion (Wells, 2007). 
While the research pointed out an important area of inquiry other scholars have 
not addressed, i.e. images of children; the study lacks methodological rigor. The author 
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did not qualify the reasons for choosing the Daily Mirror and The Guardian, or explain 
the methods used to investigate these photographs. The author failed to provide an 
explicit period of study, or discuss the sample size. The narratives would be better argued 
if the author explained how many photographs of children were analyzed, or if the 
images were classified according to narratives, or if it was explained, how the four 
photographs published within the study characterize the larger sample. 
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) also constructed an original framework for 
coding war frames of articles during the Iraq invasion. The authors compared the 
newspaper coverage of the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States during the 
Iraq War in 2003. The United States and Sweden were selected because of their differing 
political systems, media structures, journalistic values, and positions on the Iraq War. 
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) conducted a content analysis of the leading newspapers 
in both countries, the Dagens Nyheter and The New York Times. The researchers 
retrieved 172 articles from Dagen Nyheter and 1,417 articles from The New York Times, 
and then extracted a sample of the New York Times resulting in 236 articles. Therefore, 
408 articles were analyzed under several categories. Articles were coded for specific 
mentions of political leaders, and groups or countries. The types of sources cited were 
classified under government official, military personnel, individual, journalist, or terrorist 
group member. The tone of the war coverage was coded for positive, negative or neutral 
on the U.S. position on the war. The news frames coded were military conflict (military 
action, troops, equipment, etc.); human interest frame (emphasis on human participants); 
responsibility frame (party/person responsible for the event); diagnostic frame (what 
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caused the event); prognostic frame (possible consequences of the event); violence of war 
frame; anti-war protest, and media self-reference frame (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). 
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) found several differences between the two 
newspapers. The tone of Dagens Nyheter’s coverage was found to be more negative in 
tone than The New York Times’ coverage. There were several statistically significant 
differences among war frames. The U.S. was much more likely to include military 
conflict and prognostic war frames, while the Swedish press included more anti-war 
protest frames and responsibility frames. Also, The New York Times relied on more 
official government and military sources than Dagens Nyheter. Finally, the U.S. press 
focused more heavily on human-interest frames of American participants, while the 
Swedish press emphasized Iraqi civilians (Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005). Overall, the 
authors found the two newspapers covered the Iraq war differently in terms of tone, war 
framing, and sources. While The New York Times coverage was dominated by military 
conflict developments and battles, the Dagens Nyheter was more likely to report on anti-
war protests and responsibility issues regarding the Iraq War (Dimitrova & Stromback, 
2005). 
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) elaborated on the methods used in 
Dimitrova and Stromback (2005) and applied those to visual images. The authors 
compared media coverage in Egypt, Qatar, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) included previous research that suggested the 
American public was exposed to different news coverage of the Iraq war in print and 
broadcast media, in comparison to other countries. Specifically, U.S. networks ignored 
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covering opposition to the war and instead provided a “sanitized picture of the war” 
(Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 157). 
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) downloaded the home pages of The New 
York Times (nytimes.com), The Guardian (guardian.co.uk), Al Ahram (ahram.org.eg) the 
online newspaper in Egypt, and Al Jazeera (aljazeera.net) during the invasion from 
March 20, 2003, to May 1, 2003. All headlines, text, and photos associated with the Iraq 
War were content analyzed, totaling 112 home pages. Clear differences were found 
between the Arab and Coalition online media. The most predominant frames in the Arab 
media were “military conflict” and “violence of war” including heavy depiction of 
destruction with military and civilian casualties (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 
161). The Arab media ignored the “rebuilding of Iraq” frame in contrast to the Coalition 
media (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 161). Also, the British and American 
news sites focused more heavily on looting. However, there were individual differences 
among the four media sites. The tone of Al Jazeera’s site was significantly more negative 
than that of Al Ahram, and The Guardian used anti-war frames more often than The New 
York Times. 
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) concluded the differences in framing 
suggest that Arab and Coalition media portrayed “different tales of the same war” in their 
online news coverage (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, p. 162). While the Arab 
online audience saw a war with heavy military and civilian casualties represented in 
online images, the Coalition media emphasized the long-term benefits of a democratic 
government resulting from war. Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) pointed to public 
opinion of host countries as the most likely reason for variations of war coverage. The 
 19	  
authors were successful in adding to the few studies that have conducted comparative 
analyses and included the Arab world. However, within the study they classified western 
journalistic practices as objective, an arguable assertion. Future research would benefit by 
consistent methodologies for comparing war coverage. 
Hammond (2003) examined the role of media, specifically U.S. and U.K. 
journalists in representing images that are supportive or critical of the war in Iraq. 
Hammond (2003) discussed the highly “image-conscious” media and stated that 
“producing the right image” is just as important as achieving tangible results on the 
ground (p. 23). Hammond (2003) discussed the role of U.S. media campaigns in filming 
military soldiers performing “heart-warming duties” including helping injured Iraqi 
children (p. 26). U.K. media was found to be much more critical, questioning the validity 
of the war and nature of U.S. media images. One BBC correspondent predicted the Iraq 
war would be “justified in the lofty rhetoric of human rights,” warning his audience: “Get 
ready for a new generation of heart-wrenching images” (Hammond, 2003, p. 34). 
Susan Carruthers (2008) in “No one’s looking: the disappearing audience for war” 
discussed the American public’s apathy for the war. Carruthers (2008) discussed how the 
Iraq war has become largely unpopular in the U.S., but has been unable to stir animation, 
emotion, or unrest from its citizens. Television airtime for Iraq has dwindled; embedded 
reporters have become too expensive financially and too dangerous (claiming the lives of 
110 journalists). 
Efforts by independent filmmakers and some Hollywood efforts to cover the Iraq 
war have found disinterested American audiences. The insurgency has become old news, 
despite the large amount of visual images and growing films available online and through 
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foreign news sources. Carruthers (2008) discussed the debate on Capitol Hill on when 
and how to “draw down” the troops; however, the disconnected American public has not 
called for any critical account or inspection of the war efforts and their effects. Carruthers 
(2008) concludes with a call for future research on these “contemporary peculiarities” of 
anemic dissent (p. 74). 
The results and methods from Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Persian Gulf War study 
influenced later research investigating war reporting. Building upon previous research 
methods for visual content analyses helps to build a more solid framework for future 
studies. From the literature, it is evident that disparate media coverage of the Iraq 
invasion across media platforms and/or countries exists. Griffin’s (2004) study identified 
a change in the framing of the war by American media after the invasion of Iraq, an area 
ripe for further examination. 
How the American and British media continued to cover the Iraq War eight years 
after President Bush declared mission accomplished needs to be analyzed. Updated 
research on how the American and British presses continued to cover such a controversial 
war provides insight to the complex relationships between government, international 
interests, the public’s right to know, and the press. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODS 
 
The literature on tone, framing of war, and war narratives has revealed differential 
visual coverage during the 2003 Iraq invasion period. This thesis compares the 
newspapers of the Coalition forces; the United States through The New York Times and 
the United Kingdom through The Guardian for two months during the occupation period 
(selecting 2006), and five weeks leading up to the designated end/closure of the war in 
2011. To examine visual differences depicted within the publications, the study will 
explore the following research questions: 
RQ1: How will The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their 
frequency of published images, size and placement in 2006 and 2011? 
RQ2: How did the The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their 
newspaper coverage after the invasion period in 2006 and 2011 in terms of 
war frames and narratives? 
RQ3: Did the war frames, and narratives change over time within each 
newspaper? If so, how? 
Based on the review of literature, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: The New York Times will publish a higher frequency of images than The 
Guardian in their respective newspapers, but the size and placement of the 
images will be similar.  
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H2: The Guardian will include more critical coverage of the Iraq War than The 
New York Times in 2006 and 2011. 
H3: Both newspapers will include more frames depicting violence, destruction, 
and societal chaos of war in 2006; and the 2011 coverage will focus on the 
departing troops and include much less critical and graphic images of the 
war. 
In utilizing The New York Times and The Guardian to represent newspaper coverage 
from the United States and the United Kingdom, this research is replicating an earlier 
study by Fahmy and Kim (2008) that analyzed the invasion period. This study chose to 
analyze images, which often after a conflict becomes iconic historical representations of 
previous wars. This study chose to examine war periods beyond the initial invasions in 
order to compare and analyze how news organizations represent and cover long-term 
conflicts that were initially intended to be short-term excursions. By uncovering how 
these two newspapers visually represented the Iraq War in 2006 and 2011 new insight 
can be brought to how these news organizations and countries positioned the war in 
informing the public of the progress and close of the war. 
This study provides a comparative analysis of war images from the American and 
British presses. A content analysis of published Iraq War images was conducted using 
The New York Times and The Guardian. In order to access these images, microform 
copies of the newspapers were analyzed. This study was not able to utilize digital 
databases of these newspapers, as the digitized versions often exclude the photographic 
images printed with the news stories for copyright purposes. This study analyzes Iraq 
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War images and utilizes headlines and photographic captions as references in coding the 
American and British presses. 
The New York Times and The Guardian were chosen for their journalistic quality 
and international prestige. These newspapers serve as important mouthpieces for the 
presses for the United States and the United Kingdom. Previous studies have utilized the 
print or online version of The New York Times (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; 
Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005) and The Guardian (Dimitrova & 
Connolly-Ahern, 2007, Fahmy & Kim, 2008) to represent newspaper coverage from their 
respective countries. 
The research focused on images from two distinct periods after the 2003 invasion, 
in 2006 and 2011(the middle and end of the war respectively). These two periods, 
drawing from sources in The New York Times and The Guardian, feature moments from 
the occupation, and the close of the war. The occupation period was chosen for the end of 
2006, when the Associated Press reported the largest amount of war casualties. 
Therefore, the months of November and December in 2006, were determined to be 
especially newsworthy period during the war. The examination included materials from 
the month leading up to the official end, between November 18, 2011, and December 21, 
2011. 
The unit of analysis chosen in this study was the individual news photograph, 
although surrounding content including captions and articles was taken into account 
while coding. Every photograph within the two periods that portrays the Iraq War will be 
analyzed. Images were collected from the main news sections (the first few pages), from 
the International sections, National news sections, and the Metro sections. The following 
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sections with images were excluded: Business; Editorial (comment and analysis, and 
cartoon depictions); special features presented at the back of the newspaper; and 
published advertisements pertaining to the war. 
Also one of the limitations of the study was that The Guardian does not publish 
on Sundays and did not publish on several holidays that The New York Times did, which 
might have affected the frequency of images published. The following were dates that 
publications occurred for The New York Times but were absent for The Guardian: 
11/5/2006, 11/12/2006, 11/19/2006, 11/26/2006, 12/3/2006, 12/10/2006, 12/17/2006, 
12/24/2006, 12/25/2006, 12/26/2006, 12/31/2006, 11/6/2011, 11/13/2011, 11/20/2011, 
11/27/2011, 12/4/2011, 12/11/2011, 12/18/2011, and 12/25/2011. 
This study merged classification categories from previous literature, including 
Griffin and Lee (1995); Griffin (2004); Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007); and King 
and Lester (2005). Also, new classification categories were introduced that have not been 
previously applied in visual analyses of war to elaborate on previous war frames. Griffin 
and Lee’s (1995) and Griffin’s (2004) categories were centered on coding manifest 
content, items that are more concrete and recognizable. Also, these categories are 
mutually exclusive; therefore, an image could only be classified under a single category. 
Griffin and Lee’s (1995) and Griffin’s (2004) methods for coding include the 
following classifications (some categories have been modified to reflect the Iraq War): 
arsenal/noncombat (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); 
civilian casualties (U.S. and U.K.); (Iraqi); 
civilian life (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); 
combat (all nations); 
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damage and destruction (Iraq); 
ecological subjects; 
historical photos (All nations); 
media; 
military casualties (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); 
military leaders (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); 
oil and energy; 
political leaders (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); (Arab world, excluding 
Iraq); (United Nations, and others, excluding Arab and Coalition leaders); 
prisoners of war (POWs) (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); 
public demonstrations (Coalition nations, U.S. and U.K.); (Arab); 
troops/noncombat (Coalition forces, U.S. and U.K.); (Iraq); 
wartime civilian life (Iraq); 
and other. 
Scholars including, Griffin (2004), Fahmy and Kim (2008), Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock 
(2009) have utilized Griffin and Lee’s (1995) coding as a baseline and have merged or 
adjusted categories. 
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) coded manifest and latent content, which 
includes underlying meanings of communications in their study. Their coding includes 
classifications that are mutually exclusive and others that are not. Classifications for tone 
were mutually exclusive: items were coded as positive toward the U.S. position on the 
war; negative toward the U.S. position on the war; or neutral/mixed — i.e., neither 
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clearly positive nor clearly negative toward the U.S. position on the war. The war frames 
the authors coded were not mutually exclusive, these categories included: 
anti-war protest; 
diagnostic frame (reasons for leading to war); 
human interest (focus on human participants); 
looting frame; 
media self-reference (emphasis of the role of journalists); 
oil resources frame; 
prognostic frame (long-term effects of the war); 
rebuilding of Iraq; 
responsibility frame (looking for blame); 
violence of war (destruction and human cost of war); 
and war frames (military conflict, focus on troops and military developments); 
Also, the type of sources cited were coded (government official, military personnel, 
individual journalist, terrorist group member, and other). Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern 
(2007) also coded the use of negative moral terms within their study. 
King & Lester’s (2005) study analyzed the first week of the start of the ground 
war in 1991 and 2003. The unit of analysis for the study was the individual photograph, 
and all the images were classified under one of ten categories: fighting scenes, deceased 
soldiers, battlefield scenes, prisoners, civilians, home front subjects, protestors, portraits, 
and miscellaneous. Also, the images were coded for source (staff photographer, pool 
photographer, miscellaneous); page selection (front page, front section, or second 
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section); page placement (top, middle, or lower third); photographic perspective; and size 
of photograph. 
In coding for war frames, this study applied a combination of Dimitrova and 
Connolly-Ahern’s (2007), Griffin and Lee’s (1995), and King and Lester’s (2005) 
methods. Originally this study intended to code for tone, positive, negative, or 
neutral/mixed; however, the images in 2006 included complex messages making the 
coding process too difficult to delineate between negative and neutral/mixed tone. Also, 
while positive tone was a category, it was not anticipated that any images would be 
classified under this category. Some categories from Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s 
(2007), Griffin and Lee’s (1995), and King and Lester’s (2005) studies were merged, and 
some categories were introduced, such as Iraq study group, Saddam’s trial, Donald 
Rumsfeld’s exiting as defense secretary, societal chaos of war, and war atrocities. 
Within the classifications of war frames, this study will emulate Dimitrova and 
Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) methods — where the category of war frames is not mutually 
exclusive. Images often include several elements and competing messages; therefore, 
images within this study can be categorized as being in more than one war frame 
category. However, this study will mitigate the overlap of categories by the explicitness 
of the classifications. Also, the use of headlines and captions within the publications will 
be instrumental in coding the war frames appropriately. 
The following categories analyzed within this study are as follows: 
Anti-war Protest; or anti-U.S. or anti-U.K. public demonstration (Coalition or 
Arab countries): These images include an individual or assembly of people either 
protesting against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces in Iraq. 
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Atrocities and/or Scandals of War (committed by Coalition military, Saddam’s 
regime, or the Iraqi government): These are clearly defined atrocities or scandals where 
the headlines or captions define the actions as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary 
torture. Often as a result, a trial or official investigation is or was underway within the 
publication. 
Coalition Military Troops: This denotes a visual presence of coalition military 
troops, and these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded 
under wounded coalition soldiers, human cost of war for coalition troops, human-interest 
stories, or atrocities by coalition soldiers. 
Coalition Troop Withdrawal: This category is only represented for events during 
the year 2011, during the withdrawal of Coalition military. These images include visual 
representations of packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. 
after leaving Iraq. 
Diagnostic Frame: Refers to images that are visual representations of the reasons 
leading to war from the invading forces’ perspective. Images of Saddam Hussein, other 
defined enemies, and/or enemy weapons will be classified under this category. 
Donald Rumsfeld’s Exiting as Defense Secretary: Rumsfeld lost political support 
as the Iraq War continued and resigned in late 2006. Images of Rumsfeld’s departure 
were separated from images of political figures because his resignation signaled a change 
in how the war would be handled. 
Human Cost of War (Coalition soldiers or Iraqi casualties): These images 
represent loss; coffins, gravesites, military photos of the deceased, funeral processions, 
and visible grieving by family or loved ones. The caption of some images may mention 
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casualties occurred from bombings or other activities, but unless the images show a 
visual representation of loss as expressed above they are not classified as human cost of 
war. 
Human-Interest Stories (Iraqi civilians, Iraqi military/police, Coalition soldiers, 
Coalition civilians): These images emphasize the human participants in the event. The 
captions of these images include the name/s of the people depicted within the images, 
which is also referenced within the articles that correspond to the images. Images are not 
double coded as human interest and as Iraqi civilian, Iraqi police, or coalition military 
troops. However, if there are other people in the background of an image that are not 
referenced by name then these other categories can be included. Iraqi prisoners were not 
included as human interest stories, often the prisoners are referenced by name within the 
captions, but usually in terms of discussing the crime or the context surrounding the 
imprisonment. Also, human cost of war was not included under human interest story. 
However, if the image was of a grieving family member and included the name of the 
family member grieving — it was coded for human cost of war for coalition casualties 
and human interest story for coalition civilians. 
Iraq Study Group: This war frame category was only included during events in 
the year 2006. The Iraq study group refers to a panel of individuals selected to investigate 
the progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War, and make recommendations as to the 
future course of the involvement from the U.S. and U.K. 
Iraqi Civilians: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi civilians, these images are 
only coded in this category if they are not already coded under human-interest stories, 
antiwar protest, or cheering celebrating an event associated with the war. 
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Iraqi Police/Military: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi policy/military; 
these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under human-
interest stories of Iraqi military. 
Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons (not Saddam): This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi 
prisoners or prisons 
Military Activity: This is Coalition activity and images of Coalition military 
arsenal and military conflict. In 2006, this may include military patrols and withdrawal or 
change of military bases in Iraq; however, this does not include the military withdrawal 
from Iraq in 2011. 
Political Figures: These are images of political figures from Coalition or Arab 
countries including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, members of congress, 
high-ranking military officials, and other public officials. These images do not include 
images of Saddam. 
Rebuilding of Iraq: These images show how Coalition forces or Iraqis are 
involved in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure through roads, bridges, buildings, etc. Also, 
images depicting democratic progress (through voting, or other areas) would also fall into 
this category. 
Saddam’s Trial: In 2006, Saddam’s trial was highly publicized, these are images 
around the trial, but do not include images of Saddam. 
Societal Chaos of War, and/or Bombings and Insurgent Activity: The captions of 
these images mention bombings and/or insurgent activity; they may also refer to negative 
consequences or aftermath that was a direct result of insurgent activity. 
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Violence/Destruction of War: These images may include fire, bullets, violence, 
visible bloodshed, and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. These photographs 
may show graphic images of slain bodies, however, if the bodies are covered by a sheet, a 
body bag, or coffin and do not show blood they will be classified under human cost of 
war. 
Wounded Disabled (Coalition soldiers or Iraqis): These photographs may contain 
images of fresh injuries or fully healed injuries that result in disfigurement or 
amputations. If the images are fresh and blood is visible, the images are also classified as 
violence/destruction of war. 
Other: War frames that cannot be classified under any other category listed above. 
After all data were coded, the most predominant frames, as well as 
underrepresented categories, were further analyzed for the findings section. The most 
highly represented frames were grouped into representative narratives that discuss the 
overall tone of the war coverage during these three periods of investigation. The largest 
obstacle this study faced involves ensuring inter-coder reliability that becomes more 
difficult when latent content was coded. Also, it was anticipated that coding reliability 
might become difficult because some photographs may be in more than one war frame; 
however, with pilot coding training and testing — this study mitigated those problems, as 
reflected in the following chapter. Chapter Three describes the findings of the methods 
previously described. 
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Intercoder Reliability 
In order to test for intercoder reliability, 10 percent of the 377-sample size was 
tested. The researcher coded all of the images, and a graduate student in Journalism and 
Media Studies coded the first 38 images in the sample size. A Kappa test was run on all 
of the war frames and categories. Intercoder reliability analysis by Landis and Koch 
(1977) was utilized for the interpretation of results. The following categories had perfect 
agreement at the Kappa value of 1: diagnostic frame, political coalition figures, military 
activity, antiwar protests from Arab countries, human-interest stories of Coalition 
civilians, and societal chaos of war. 
The following categories were mutually agreed upon as not being represented in 
the 38 sample size: Saddam trial; political Arab figures; Iraqi military; Iraqi 
prisoners/prisons; rebuilding Iraq frame; anti-war protest from Coalition countries; 
human interest stories of Iraqi civilians; human interest stories of Iraqi military; atrocities 
by Saddam’s regime; atrocities by Iraqi regime; Iraqi study group; returning Coalition 
soldiers; and other. The frames that were found to be in substantial agreement (between 
0.61-0.80) were: Donald Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary (0.64); Coalition troops 
(0.72); human cost of war for Coalition casualties (0.80); human cost of war for Iraqi 
casualties (0.64); and wounded Coalition soldiers (0.64). Photograph size was found to be 
in moderate agreement at 0.41 (between 0.41-0.60). The following categories were found 
to be in fair agreement (between 0.21-0.40): Iraqi civilians (0.29); violence/destruction of 
war (0.31); wounded Iraqis (0.31); celebrating events of war from Coalition countries 
(0.31); celebrating events of war from Arab countries (0.31); human interest stories of 
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Coalition soldiers (0.31); and atrocities of Coalition military (0.31). (The complete Kappa 
tests are located in Appendix I). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FINDINGS 
The study included 377 images were collected from The Guardian and The New 
York Times from microfilm. These images were taken from newspapers from November 
1, 2006, to December 31, 2006, and from November 18, 2011, to December 21, 2011. 
The 2006 images were collected over a two-month period that coincided with one of the 
bloodiest times during the Iraq war, with the largest amount of civilian casualties reported 
by the Associated Press. On December 15, 2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta 
declared the Iraq War over, and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011, 
marking the end of the war. Therefore, November 18, 2011, to December 21, 2011, was 
selected to collect images corresponding to the end of the conflict. 
RQ1: How will The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their 
frequency of published images, size, and placement in their newspapers in 2006 and 
2011? 
In order to answer RQ1, frequencies of the published Iraq images were run in 
both newspapers. The sizes of the published images were compared in both The New 
York Times and The Guardian. Finally, images were analyzed according to which page 
number the image was published within the newspapers. 
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Frequencies 
The study sampled 293 images were collected from The New York Times, and 84 
images were collected from The Guardian during both periods. The New York Times 
published images of the Iraq War much more frequently during both time periods with a 
total of 77.7 percent compared to 22.3 percent of images published from The Guardian. 
However, the proportion of images both newspapers printed during these periods were 
very similar, which may reflect consistent editorial styles. For The New York Times, 86 
percent of their total images were printed in 2006 versus 14 percent in 2011. 
Comparatively, The Guardian printed 82.1 percent of their total images in 2006 versus 
17.9 percent in 2011. 
 
 
TABLE 1: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 and 2011 
 
Date 
Total 2006 2011 
Newspaper New York Times Count 252 41 293 
% within newspaper 86.0% 14.0% 100.0% 
% within Date 78.5% 73.2% 77.7% 
% of Total 66.8% 10.9% 77.7% 
The Guardian Count 69 15 84 
% within newspaper 82.1% 17.9% 100.0% 
% within Date 21.5% 26.8% 22.3% 
% of Total 18.3% 4.0% 22.3% 
Total Count 321 56 377 
% within newspaper 85.1% 14.9% 100.0% 
% within Date 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 85.1% 14.9% 100.0% 
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There is not a significant statistical difference in comparing the newspapers and the date 
of published images; the p value for the Chi Square test is .380. (The complete Chi 
Square test is found in Table 1 in Appendix I). 
 
Size 
The study included the category of size for classification, the larger an image is 
printed, the more prominent its visual representation on the page. Within the study, large 
images were defined as one quarter of the page or larger. Medium images were less than 
a quarter and larger than one-twelfth of the page, and small images were one-twelfth of 
the page or smaller. Also, images the size of a thumbnail or smaller were excluded from 
the study. The Guardian was much more likely to publish large images over The New 
York Times at 19 percent compared to 3.4 percent. The majority of images in both 
newspapers were medium or small with medium being the predominant size photograph 
in both newspapers. 55.3 percent of The New York Times images and 42.9 percent of The 
Guardian images were medium. The relationship between the photograph size published 
and newspaper was found to be statistically significant at the p value of .000, a highly 
significant difference. (The complete Chi Square test is found in Table 2 in Appendix I). 
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TABLE 2: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian and Photograph size 
 
photosize4 
Total Large Medium Small 
Newspaper New York Times Count 10 162 121 293 
% within newspaper 3.4% 55.3% 41.3% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 38.5% 81.8% 79.1% 77.7% 
% of Total 2.7% 43.0% 32.1% 77.7% 
The Guardian Count 16 36 32 84 
% within newspaper 19.0% 42.9% 38.1% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 61.5% 18.2% 20.9% 22.3% 
% of Total 4.2% 9.5% 8.5% 22.3% 
Total Count 26 198 153 377 
% within newspaper 6.9% 52.5% 40.6% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.9% 52.5% 40.6% 100.0% 
 
 
Placement 
Finally, to finish answering RQ1, images were analyzed according to which page 
number the image was published within the newspapers. This uses the premise that the 
closeness to the front page equates to prominence of the image. For the study, 
“ppublish3” refers to the page on which the image was published, with the pages the 
images were printed on ranging from 1 to 47 and were broken down into three categories 
designated as “1,” “2,” and “3.” The first category, 1, means the image was printed on the 
front page of the newspaper. The second category, 2, means the image was printed 
somewhere between pages 2 and 15 — the section directly after the front page. Finally, 
the third category means the image was printed somewhere from page 16 to 47. All of the 
images collected were only from the front of the newspaper including the national, 
international, and metro sections. For both newspapers, once the researcher got to the 
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finance or business sections of the publications the image collection stopped. Therefore, 
no images were collected under business/finance or in the remaining sections that 
included arts and leisure, sports, comment and analysis/editorial, or other later sections. 
Through Chi-Square analysis a statistically significant difference between 
newspaper and page images of the Iraq War were published was not found. (The 
complete Chi Square test is found in Table 3 in Appendix I). This may help make the 
argument that both newspapers have made similar editorial decisions on image 
prominence according to the page number images were published. While a statistically 
significant difference was not found based on image placement, there were some 
differences between the two newspapers. First, The New York Times was slightly more 
likely to publish images relating to the Iraq War on the front page of their newspaper with 
10.2 percent compared to The Guardian’s 8.3 percent. Also, the majority of images 
published in both newspapers were in the second and third sections, which makes sense 
because the second and third sections range from page 2 to page 47. However, where the 
majority of images are published for both newspapers is different. While 53.2 percent of 
images in The New York Times are published in the second section, 46.4 percent (the 
majority) of The Guardian’s images are published in the third section. Therefore, there is 
a slight difference in prominence in comparing both newspapers. The Guardian is 
slightly more likely to bury images of the Iraq War in their newspaper as compared to 
The New York Times. Finally, hypothesis one can be revisited and answered. 
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TABLE 3: Crosstabs New York Times and The Guardian and Page Published 
 
ppublish3 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 
Newspaper New York Times Count 30 156 107 293 
% within newspaper 10.2% 53.2% 36.5% 100.0% 
% within ppublish3 81.1% 80.4% 73.3% 77.7% 
% of Total 8.0% 41.4% 28.4% 77.7% 
The Guardian Count 7 38 39 84 
% within newspaper 8.3% 45.2% 46.4% 100.0% 
% within ppublish3 18.9% 19.6% 26.7% 22.3% 
% of Total 1.9% 10.1% 10.3% 22.3% 
Total Count 37 194 146 377 
% within newspaper 9.8% 51.5% 38.7% 100.0% 
% within ppublish3 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 9.8% 51.5% 38.7% 100.0% 
 
 
H1: The New York Times will publish a higher frequency of images than The Guardian in 
their respective newspapers, but the size and placement of the images will be similar. 
In answering H1, The New York Times did publish a higher frequency of images than The 
Guardian in their respective newspapers.  
This is a logical occurrence since the United States had deployed more troops to 
Iraq and had arguably a larger stake in its success or failings than the United Kingdom. 
Also, the image placement or what page the image was published was also found to be 
similar. However, image size was found to be statistically different based on the two 
newspapers with The Guardian more likely to publish large images over The New York 
Times and give the Iraq War images more prominence according to size. Therefore, based 
on the evidence H1 was partially supported. 
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TABLE 4: Crosstabs Page Published and Photograph Size 
 
Photosize4 
Total Large Medium Small 
Ppublish3 1.00 Count 0 28 9 37 
% within ppublish3 0.0% 75.7% 24.3% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 0.0% 14.1% 5.9% 9.8% 
% of Total 0.0% 7.4% 2.4% 9.8% 
2.00 Count 15 99 80 194 
% within ppublish3 7.7% 51.0% 41.2% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 57.7% 50.0% 52.3% 51.5% 
% of Total 4.0% 26.3% 21.2% 51.5% 
3.00 Count 11 71 64 146 
% within ppublish3 7.5% 48.6% 43.8% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 42.3% 35.9% 41.8% 38.7% 
% of Total 2.9% 18.8% 17.0% 38.7% 
Total Count 26 198 153 377 
% within ppublish3 6.9% 52.5% 40.6% 100.0% 
% within photosize4 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.9% 52.5% 40.6% 100.0% 
 
 
During the compiling of data, a crosstabulation comparing image placement and 
photograph size was also run to see if a difference exists. This analysis included both 
newspapers and found a pattern in both publications. There was a statistically significant 
difference based on photograph placement and size with a p-value of .042. (The complete 
Chi Square test is found in Table 4 in Appendix I). For both newspapers there were no 
large images printed on the front page, most likely because images compete for major 
stories on the front page of newspapers.  
The majority of front-page images in both newspapers were in the medium size 
category. The majority of all images published were of the medium size in both 
newspapers at 52.5 percent. The largest amount of images in any one section was 
medium images in the second section of the newspaper located from page 2 to 15, most 
likely because in 2006 and 2011 the Iraq War had been going on for several years, and 
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while some stories and images on the war made the front pages of both newspapers on 
occasion, the majority of the time the images were located in the second section of both 
newspapers. 
 
Analysis of Frames 
 
RQ2: How did The New York Times and The Guardian compare in their 
newspaper coverage after the invasion period in 2006 and 2011 in terms of war frames 
and narratives? 
In order to answer RQ2, the image categories and war frames need to be analyzed. 
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TABLE 5: Newspaper Frames 
Newspaper Frame NY 
Times 
(2006) 
Guardian 
(2006) 
NY 
Times 
(2011) 
Guardian 
(2011) 
All 
Media 
Percent 
of Total 
Diagnostic frame 
(Enemies/Weapons) 
16 6 0 1 23/377 6.1% 
Saddam Trial (Not Saddam, 
only in 2006) 
6 0 0 0 6/321 1.9% 
(2006) 
Political Coalition Figures  47 16 7 1 71/377 18.8% 
Political Arab Figures (Not 
Saddam) 
18 0 3 2 23/377 6.1% 
Rumsfeld Exiting as Defense 
Secretary (2006) 
8 4 0 0 12/321 3.7% 
(2006) 
Military Conflict/ Developments  23 4 1 2 30/377 8.0% 
Coalition Troops 35 9 15 6 65/377 17.2% 
Iraqi Military 12 1 2 1 16/377 4.2% 
Iraqi Civilians 59 7 6 2 74/377 19.6% 
Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons 8 1 3 2 14/377 3.7% 
Rebuilding of Iraq 0 1 1 0 2/377 0.5% 
Violence/Destruction of war 25 6 0 1 32/377 8.5% 
Human cost of war Coalition 
casualties 
3 13 0 0 16/377 4.2% 
Human cost of war Iraqi 
casualties  
31 4 2 1 38/377 10.1% 
Wounded Coalition soldiers  7 3 1 0 11/377 2.9% 
Wounded Iraqis 4 2 0 0 6/377 1.6% 
Protests from Arab countries 5 2 0 0 7/377 1.9% 
Protests from Coalition 
Countries 
1 0 0 0 1/377 0.3% 
Celebrating from Coalition 
Countries 
1 2 1 2 6/377 1.6% 
Celebrating from Arab 
Countries 
2 1 1 0 4/377 1.1% 
Human interest stories (Iraq 
Civilians) 
15 0 4 0 19/377 5.0% 
Human interest stories (Iraq 
Military) 
1 0 0 0 1/377 0.3% 
Human interest stories 
(Coalition Military) 
10 1 3 3 44/377 12.0% 
Human interest stories 
(Coalition Civilians) 
9 3 0 0 12/377 3.2% 
Societal Chaos of War 38 4 2 0 44/377 11.7% 
Atrocities by Coalition Soldiers 4 2 2 3 11/377 2.9% 
Atrocities by Saddam’s regime 1 0 0 0 1/377 0.3% 
Atrocities by Iraqi regime 1 0 1 0 2/377 0.5% 
Iraq Study Group (2006 only) 9 1 0 0 10/321 3.1% 
Returning Coalition Soldiers 
(2011 only) 
0 0 11 3 14/56 25.0% 
Other 10 1 1 0 12/377 3.2% 
Total 252 69 41 15 377/377  
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Diagnostic Frame: Refers to images that are visual representations of the reasons 
leading to war from the invading forces’ perspective. Images of Saddam Hussein, other 
defined enemies, and/or enemy weapons will be classified under this category. Of the 
377-picture sample, 6.1 percent of images were categorized under the diagnostic frame 
for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 6.9 percent of the 
images were categorized diagnostic with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the diagnostic 
frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference 
for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all 
of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square test is 
found in Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 6: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Diagnostic Frame 
 
saddam5 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 16 277 293 
The Guardian 7 77 84 
Total 23 354 377 
 
 
Saddam’s Trial: In 2006, Saddam’s trial was highly publicized, these are images 
around the trial, but do not include images of Saddam. Of the 321-sample size of 2006, 
only 1.9 percent of images were in this category. In comparing the Saddam’s trial frame 
between The New York Times and The Guardian, there were no statistical differences for 
images published between the two newspapers. (The complete Chi-Square test is found in 
Table 6 in Appendix I). 
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TABLE 7: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Saddam Trial Frame 
 
Saddamtrial6 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 6 287 293 
The Guardian 0 84 84 
Total 6 371 377 
 
 
Political Figures: These are images of political figures from Coalition or Arab 
countries including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, members of congress, 
high-ranking military officials, and other public officials. Also, these images do not 
include images of Saddam. Of the 377-picture sample, 18.8 percent of images were 
categorized under the political Coalition figures frame for both newspapers. When 
comparing the years individually, in 2006, 19.6 percent of the images were categorized 
political Coalition figures with 14.3 percent in 2011. In comparing the political Coalition 
figures frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there were no statistical 
differences for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when 
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 in Appendix I). 
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TABLE 8: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Political Coalition Figures Frame 
 
polcoalition7 
Total Yes No 
newspaper New York Times 54 239 293 
The Guardian 17 67 84 
Total 71 306 377 
	  
	  
TABLE 9: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Political Arab Figures Frame 
 
polarab8 
Total Yes No 
newspaper New York Times 21 272 293 
The Guardian 2 82 84 
Total 23 354 377 
 
 
For the political Arab countries frame 6.1 percent of the 377-picture sample was 
categorized under this frame. When comparing the political Arab countries frame 
between the two newspapers there was some variance. If both 2006 and 2011 are 
included in the comparison, there were no statistical differences between newspapers. 
However, when just 2006 is isolated, there was a statistically significant difference at the 
.022 level. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 in 
Appendix II). 
 
Donald Rumsfeld’s Exiting as Defense Secretary: Rumsfeld lost political support 
as the Iraq War continued and resigned in late 2006. Images of Rumsfeld’s departure 
were separated from images of political figures because his resignation signaled a change 
in how the war would be handled. Of the 321-sample size for 2006, 3.7 percent of images 
were categorized under Donald Rumsfeld’s exiting as defense secretary frame for both 
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newspapers. In comparing the Donald Rumsfeld exiting frame between The New York 
Times and The Guardian, there were no statistical differences for images published 
between the two newspapers. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 9 in 
Appendix II). 
 
 
TABLE 10: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Donald Rumsfeld Exiting Frame 
 
rumsfeld9 
Total Yes No 
newspape
r 
New York Times Count 8 244 252 
% within rumsfeld9 66.7% 79.0% 78.5% 
The Guardian Count 4 65 69 
% within rumsfeld9 33.3% 21.0% 21.5% 
Total Count 12 309 321 
% within rumsfeld9 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Military Activity: This is Coalition activity and images of Coalition military 
arsenal and military conflict. In 2006, this may include military patrols and withdrawal or 
change of military bases in Iraq; however, this does not include the military withdrawal 
from Iraq in 2011. For the military activity frame, 8.0 percent of the 377-picture sample 
was categorized under this frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 8.4 percent of the images were categorized under military activity 
with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the military activity frame between The New York 
Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published 
between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 
and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 10.1, 
10.2, and 10.3 in Appendix I). 
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TABLE 11: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Military Conflict Frame 
 
mconflict10 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 24 269 293 
The Guardian 6 78 84 
Total 30 347 377 
 
 
Coalition Military Troops: This denotes a visual presence of coalition military 
troops, and these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded 
under wounded coalition soldiers, human cost of war for coalition troops, human-interest 
stories, or atrocities by coalition soldiers. Of the 377-picture sample, 17.2 percent of 
images were categorized under the Coalition military troops category for both 
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 13.7 percent of the images 
were categorized Coalition military troops with 37.5 percent in 2011. In comparing the 
Coalition military troops category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there 
was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two 
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 11.1, 11.2, and 11.3 in 
Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 12: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Coalition Troops Frame  
 
coaltroops11 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 50 243 293 
The Guardian 15 69 84 
Total 65 312 377 
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Iraqi Police/Military: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi policy/military; 
these images are only coded in this category if they are not already coded under human-
interest stories of Iraqi military. Within the 377-picture sample, 4.2 percent of images 
were categorized under the Iraqi police/military for both newspapers. When comparing 
the years individually, in 2006, 4.0 percent of the images were categorized Iraqi 
police/military with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi military troops category 
between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference in the 
amount of images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when 
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 13: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Military Frame  
 
iraqipolicemil12 
Total Yes No 
newspaper New York Times 14 279 293 
The Guardian 2 82 84 
Total 16 361 377 
 
Iraqi Civilians: This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi civilians, these images are 
only coded in this category if they are not already coded under human-interest stories, 
antiwar protest, or cheering celebrating an event associated with the war. Of the 377-
picture sample, 19.6 percent of images were categorized under the Iraqi civilians for both 
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 20.6 percent of the images 
were categorized Iraqi civilians with 14.3 percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi 
civilians category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was a 
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significant statistical difference at the .020 level in the amount of images published 
between the two newspapers when comparing both years. When isolating for 2006, the 
statistical relationship is even higher at the .016 level. However, when comparing only 
2011 the difference is no longer significant and is at the .90 level. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 13.1, 13.2, and 13.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 14: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Civilians Frame 
 
iraqicivil13 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 65 228 293 
The Guardian 9 75 84 
Total 74 303 377 
 
 
Iraqi Prisoners/Prisons (not Saddam): This denotes a visual presence of Iraqi 
prisoners or prisons. For the 377-picture sample, 3.7 percent of images were categorized 
under the Iraqi prisoners/prisons for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 2.8 percent of the images were categorized Iraqi prisoners with 8.9 
percent in 2011. In comparing the Iraqi prisoners’ category between The New York Times 
and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the 
two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and 
individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 14.1, 14.2, 
and 14.3 in Appendix I). 
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TABLE 15: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraqi Prison Frame 
 
iraqipprison14 
Total Yes No 
newspaper New York Times 11 282 293 
The Guardian 3 81 84 
Total 14 363 377 
 
 
Rebuilding of Iraq: These images show how Coalition forces or Iraqis are 
involved in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure through roads, bridges, buildings, etc. (this 
also includes repurposed buildings). Also, images depicting democratic progress (through 
voting, or other areas) would also fall into this category. Of the 377-picture sample, 0.5 
percent of images were categorized under the rebuilding of Iraq frame for both 
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images 
were categorized rebuilding of Iraq 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the rebuilding of 
Iraq frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical 
difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when 
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 15.1, 15.2, and 15.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 16: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Rebuilding Iraq Frame 
 
rebuiliraq15 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 1 292 293 
The Guardian 1 83 84 
Total 2 375 377 
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Violence/destruction of war – these images may include fire, bullets, violence, 
visible bloodshed and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. These photographs 
may show graphic images of slain bodies, however, if the bodies are covered by a sheet, a 
body bag, or coffin and do not show blood they will be classified under human cost of 
war. Within the 377-picture sample, 8.5 percent of images were categorized under the 
violence/destruction of war frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 9.7 percent of the images were categorized violence/destruction of 
war 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the violence/destruction of war frame between The 
New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images 
published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 
with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in 
Table 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 in Appendix I). 
 
TABLE 17: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Violence/Destruction Frame 
 
violdestruc16 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 25 268 293 
The Guardian 7 77 84 
Total 32 345 377 
 
 
Human cost of war (Coalition soldiers or Iraqi casualties) – these images 
represent loss, this may be visualized by coffins, gravesites, military photos of the 
deceased, funeral processions, and visible grieving by family or loved ones. The caption 
of some images may mention casualties occurred from bombings or other activities, but 
unless the images show a visual representation of loss as expressed above they are not 
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classified as human cost of war. Of the 377 total sample, 4.2 percent of images were 
categorized under the human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame for both 
newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 5.0 percent of the images 
were categorized human cost of war for Coalition soldiers with 0.0 percent in 2011. In 
comparing the human cost of war frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, 
there was a significant difference at the .000 level when including both years. When 
isolating for 2006, the statistical difference is also at the .000 level. However, when 
comparing only 2011 the difference no longer exists (there were no images of coalition 
casualties in 2011). (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 17.1 and 17.2 in 
Appendix I). 
 
  
TABLE 18: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Cost of War for Coalition 
Casualties Frame 
 
hcostcoal17 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 3 290 293 
The Guardian 13 71 84 
Total 16 361 377 
 
 
For the 377-picture sample, 10.1 percent of images were categorized under the human 
cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 10.9 percent of the images were categorized human cost of war for 
Iraqi casualties with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the human cost of war for Iraqi 
casualties category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no 
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statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers. 
This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. 
(The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 19: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Cost of War for Iraqi 
Casualties Frame 
 
hcostiraqi18 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 33 260 293 
The Guardian 5 79 84 
Total 38 339 377 
 
Wounded disabled (Coalition soldiers or Iraqis): These photographs may contain 
images of fresh injuries or fully healed injuries that result in disfigurement or 
amputations. If the images are fresh and blood is visible, the images are also classified as 
violence/destruction of war. Within the 377-picture sample, 2.9 percent of images were 
categorized under the wounded disabled Coalition soldiers category for both newspapers. 
When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.1 percent of the images were 
categorized wounded disabled Coalition soldiers with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing 
the wounded disabled Coalition soldiers category between The New York Times and The 
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two 
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 19.1, 19.2, and 19.3 in 
Appendix I). 
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TABLE 20: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Wounded Coalition Soldiers Frame 
 
woundcoal19 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 8 285 293 
The Guardian 3 81 84 
Total 11 366 377 
 
 
TABLE 21: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Wounded Iraqis Frame 
 
woundiraq20 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 4 289 293 
The Guardian 2 82 84 
Total 6 371 377 
 
 
Of the 377-picture sample, 1.6 percent of images were categorized under the 
wounded/disabled Iraqis category for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized wounded/disabled 
Iraqis with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the wounded/disabled Iraqis category 
between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for 
images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 
2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found 
in Table 20.1 and 20.2 in Appendix I). 
 
Anti-War Protest/ or anti- U.S. or U.K. public demonstration (Coalition or Arab 
countries): These images include an individual or assembly of people either protesting 
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against the Iraq War or against the intervention of the invading forces in Iraq. For the 377 
total sample, 1.9 percent of images were categorized under the anti-war protest frame 
from Arab countries for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 
2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized anti-war protest from Arab countries 
with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the anti-war protest frame from Arab countries 
category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical 
difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when 
comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 21.1 and 21.2 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 22: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Anti-war Protest from Arab Countries 
Frame 
 
protestarab21 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 5 288 293 
The Guardian 2 82 84 
Total 7 370 377 
 
 
Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the anti-
war protest frame from Coalition countries for both newspapers. When comparing the 
years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized anti-war protest 
from Coalition countries with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the anti-war protest 
frame from Coalition countries category between The New York Times and The 
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two 
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newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 22.1 and 22.2 in 
Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 23: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Anti-war Protest from Coalition 
Countries Frame 
 
protestcoal22 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 1 292 293 
The Guardian 0 84 84 
Total 1 376 377 
 
 
Celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War (Coalition or Arab countries) — 
these images include an assembly of individuals cheering/celebrating an event associated 
with the war. Of the 377-picture sample, 1.6 percent of images were categorized under 
the celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War frame from Coalition countries for 
both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.9 percent of the 
images were categorized celebrating an event associated to the Iraq war from Coalition 
countries with 5.4 percent in 2011. In comparing the celebrating an event associated to 
the Iraq War frame from Coalition countries category between The New York Times and 
The Guardian, there was a significant statistical difference at the .008 level in the amount 
of images published between the two newspapers. However, when isolating for 2006 and 
2011 this difference was no longer significant. Also, it is important to note how small the 
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sample size is for this category. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 23.1, 
23.2, and 23.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 24: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Celebrating an Event Associated with 
the War from Coalition Countries 
 
celebcoal23 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 2 291 293 
The Guardian 4 80 84 
Total 6 371 377 
  
 
For the 377-picture sample, 1.1 percent of images were categorized under the celebrating 
an event associated to the Iraq War frame from Arab countries for both newspapers. 
When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 0.9 percent of the images were 
categorized celebrating an event associated to the Iraq War frame from Arab countries 
with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the celebrating an event associated to the Iraq 
War frame from Arab countries category between The New York Times and The 
Guardian, there was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between 
the two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and 
individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 24.1, 24.2, 
and 24.3 in Appendix I). 
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TABLE 25: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Celebrating an Event Associated with 
the War from Arab Countries 
 
Celebarab24 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 3 290 293 
The Guardian 1 83 84 
Total 4 373 377 
 
 
Human Interest Stories (Iraqi Civilians, Iraqi Military/Police, Coalition Soldiers, 
Coalition Civilians): These images emphasize the human participants in the event. The 
captions of these images include the name/s of the people depicted within the images, 
which is also referenced within the articles that correspond to the images. Images are not 
double coded as human interest and as Iraqi civilian, Iraqi police, or coalition military 
troops. However, if there are other people in the background of an image that are not 
referenced by name then these other categories can be included. Iraqi prisoners were not 
included as human interest stories, often the prisoners are referenced by name within the 
captions, but usually in terms of discussing the crime or the context surrounding the 
imprisonment. Also, human cost of war was not included under human interest story. 
However, if the image was of a grieving family member and included the name of the 
family member grieving—it was coded for human cost of war for coalition casualties and 
human interest story for coalition civilians. 
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TABLE 26: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Iraqi 
Civilians Frame 
 
Humiraqciv25 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 19 274 293 
The Guardian 0 84 84 
Total 19 358 377 
 
 
Of the 377-picture sample, 5.0 percent of images were categorized under the human 
interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 4.7 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories 
for Iraqi civilians with 7.1 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories for 
Iraqi civilians category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was a 
statistically significant difference at the .017 level in the amount of images published 
between the two newspapers. The New York Times was much more likely to publish these 
images over The Guardian. When isolating for 2006 this was significant at the .038 level, 
however, was not longer significant when only looking at 2011. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 25.1, 25.2, and 25.3 in Appendix I). 
Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the 
human-interest stories for Iraqi military for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories 
for Iraqi military with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories for 
Iraqi military category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no 
statistical difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case 
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when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete 
Chi-Square tests are found in Table 26.1 and 26.2 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 27: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Iraqi 
Military Frame 
 
Humiraqmil26 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 1 292 293 
The Guardian 0 84 84 
Total 1 376 377 
 
 
Of the 377-picture sample, 12.0 percent of images were categorized under the human 
interest stories for Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories 
for Coalition military with 10.7 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories 
for Coalition military category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there 
was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two 
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 27.1, 27.2, and 27.3 in 
Appendix I). 
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TABLE 28: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Coalition 
Soldiers Frame 
 
Humcoalsol27 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 13 280 293 
The Guardian 4 80 84 
Total 17 360 377 
 
 
Within the 377-picture sample, 3.2 percent of images were categorized under the human-
interest stories for Coalition civilians for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 3.7 percent of the images were categorized human-interest stories 
for Coalition civilians with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the human-interest stories 
for Coalition civilians category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there 
was no statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two 
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 28.1 and 28.2 in 
Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 29: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Human Interest Stories for Coalition 
Civilians Frame 
 
Humcoalciv28 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 9 284 293 
The Guardian 3 81 84 
Total 12 365 377 
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Societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity – the captions of 
these images mention bombings and/or insurgent activity, they may also refer to negative 
consequences or aftermath that were a direct result of insurgent activity. For the 377-
picture sample, 11.7 percent of images were categorized under the societal chaos of war 
for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 13.1 percent of the 
images were categorized societal chaos of war with 3.6 percent in 2011. In comparing the 
societal chaos of war category between The New York Times and The Guardian, there 
was a significant statistical difference at the .025 level in the amount of images published 
between the two newspapers. When isolating for 2006 the difference was significant at 
the .043 level. The New York Times was much more likely to show images of societal 
chaos of war frame than The Guardian. However, when isolating for 2011 the difference 
was no longer significant. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 29.1, 29.2, 
and 29.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 30: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Societal Chaos of War Frame 
 
socichaos29 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 40 253 293 
The Guardian 4 80 84 
Total 44 333 377 
 
 
Atrocities and/or scandals of war (committed by Coalition military, Saddam’s 
regime, or the Iraqi government): These are clearly defined atrocities or scandals where 
the headlines or captions define the actions as illegal, abuse, rape, and/or unnecessary 
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torture. Often as a result, a trial or official investigation is or was underway within the 
publication. Of the 377-picture sample, 2.9 percent of images were categorized under the 
atrocities of war committed by Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing 
the years individually, in 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized atrocities of 
war committed by Coalition military with 8.9 percent in 2011. In comparing the 
atrocities of war committed by Coalition military category between The New York Times 
and The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the 
two newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and 
individually based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 30.1, 30.2, 
and 30.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 31: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Coalition Soldiers Frame 
 
Atroccoalm30 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 6 287 293 
The Guardian 5 79 84 
Total 11 366 377 
 
 
Within the 377-picture sample, 0.3 percent of images were categorized under the 
atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime for both newspapers. When comparing 
the years individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized atrocities of 
war committed by Saddam’s regime with 0.0 percent in 2011. In comparing the atrocities 
of war committed by Saddam’s regime category between The New York Times and The 
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two 
 64	  
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 31.1 and 31.2 in 
Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 32: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Saddam’s Regime Frame 
 
Atrocsadd31 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 1 292 293 
The Guardian 0 84 84 
Total 1 376 377 
 
 
Of the 377-picture sample, 0.5 percent of images were categorized under the atrocities of 
war committed by the Iraqi regime for both newspapers. When comparing the years 
individually, in 2006, 0.3 percent of the images were categorized atrocities of war 
committed by the Iraqi regime with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the atrocities of 
war committed by the Iraqi regime category between The New York Times and The 
Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two 
newspapers. This was the case when comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually 
based on year. (The complete Chi-Square tests are found in Table 32.1, 32.2, and 32.3 in 
Appendix I). 
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TABLE 33: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Atrocities by Iraqi’s Regime Frame 
 
atrociraq32 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 2 291 293 
The Guardian 0 84 84 
Total 2 375 377 
 
 
Iraq Study Group: This war frame category was only included during the 2006 
period. The Iraq study group refers to a panel of individuals selected to investigate the 
progress and ongoing situation of the Iraq War, and make recommendations as to how the 
future course of the involvement from the U.S. and U.K. For the 321-sample size for 
2006, 3.1 percent of images were categorized under the Iraq study group for both 
newspapers. In comparing the Iraq Study Group frame between The New York Times and 
The Guardian, there was no statistical difference for images published between the two 
newspapers for 2006. (The 2006 Chi-Square test is found in Table 33 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 34: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Iraq Study Group Frame 
 
iraqstudy33 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times Count 9 243 252 
% within 
iraqstudy33 
90.0% 78.1% 78.5% 
The Guardian Count 1 68 69 
% within 
iraqstudy33 
10.0% 21.9% 21.5% 
Total Count 10 311 321 
% within 
iraqstudy33 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Coalition Troop Withdrawal: This category is only represented during the 2011 
period during the troop withdrawal. These images include visual representations of 
packing to leave Iraq, traveling out of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq. 
Within the 56-picture sample size for 2011, 25.0 percent of images were categorized 
under the Coalition troop withdrawal for both newspapers. In comparing the Coalition 
troop withdrawal frame between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no 
statistical difference in the amount of images published between the two newspapers for 
2011. (The 2011 Chi-Square test is found in Table 34 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 35: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Returning Coalition Soldiers Frame 
 
 
Returncoal35 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times Count 11 30 41 
% within returncoal35 78.6% 71.4% 73.2% 
The Guardian Count 3 12 15 
% within returncoal35 21.4% 28.6% 26.8% 
Total Count 14 42 56 
% within returncoal35 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Other: War frames that cannot be classified under any other category listed above 
are coded as other. Of the 377-picture sample, 3.2 percent of images were categorized 
under other for both newspapers. When comparing the years individually, in 2006, 3.4 
percent of the images were categorized other with 1.8 percent in 2011. In comparing the 
category other between The New York Times and The Guardian, there was no statistical 
difference for images published between the two newspapers. This was the case when 
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comparing all of 2006 with 2011 and individually based on year. (The complete Chi-
Square tests are found in Table 35.1, 35.2, and 35.3 in Appendix I). 
 
 
TABLE 36: Crosstabs Newspaper Publication and Other Frame 
 
other34 
Total Yes No 
Newspaper New York Times 11 282 293 
The Guardian 1 83 84 
Total 12 365 377 
 
 
H2: The Guardian will include more critical coverage of the Iraq War than The New York 
Times in 2006 and 2011. 
In answering H2, while the war frames varied on specific categories that can be 
attributed to critical coverage of the war; i.e. human cost of war, wounded/disabled, 
societal chaos of war, anti-war protests, violence/destruction of war, and atrocities of war, 
one newspaper was not clearly more critical of the Iraq War than the other. However, 
interesting statistical differences did arise in two of these category examples. In 2006, the 
human cost of war frame for Coalition casualties was highly significant at the .000 level. 
During this time, The Guardian was much more likely to publish images depicting the 
loss of life of Coalition troops over The New York Times. Also, on the societal chaos of 
war frame The New York Times was much more likely to publish images within this 
frame over The Guardian at the .043 level in 2006. Interestingly, when comparing all the 
2011 war frames of the two newspapers there were no statistical differences between the 
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publications. Therefore, the results are mixed in answering H2, and one newspaper was 
not found to be more critical than the other was. 
RQ3: Did the war frames, and narratives change over time within each newspaper? If so 
how? 
The graphs below separate the 2006 top war frames from the 2011 data. The top five war 
frames for 2006 were the following: Iraqi Civilians (20.6 percent); political Coalition 
figures (19.6 percent); Coalition troops (13.7 percent); societal chaos of war (13.1 
percent); and human cost of Iraqi casualties (10.9 percent). The five most representative 
categories for 2011 were: returning Coalition soldiers (25 percent); Coalition troops (17.2 
percent); political Coalition figures (14.3 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.3 percent); and 
human interest stories of Coalition soldiers (10.7 percent). 
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CHART 1: Top War Frames for 2006 
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CHART 2: Top War Frames for 2011 
 
 
 
When comparing both newspapers together the war frames changed dramatically from 
2006 to 2011. The 2006 coverage was much more critical with a higher frequency of 
images depicting societal chaos of war, violence/destruction, and the human cost war for 
Coalition soldiers and Iraqis. When isolating for newspaper, for societal chaos of war, 
15.1 percent of The New York Times’ coverage fit into this category while only 5.8 
percent of The Guardian’s 2006 coverage printed images of this frame (which was a 
statistical difference at the .043 level). While there was not a statistical difference on 
human cost of war for Iraqi civilians, this frame was more prominent in The New York 
Times’ coverage (with 12.3 percent) than The Guardian’s coverage (with (5.8 percent). 
Also, it is important to note, while combined the human cost of war frame for Coalition 
casualties was 5.0 percent when including both newspapers, it represented 18.8 percent of 
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all of The Guardian’s coverage for 2006. Interestingly in 2006 while The New York 
Times focused on the loss of Iraqi civilian life (12.3 percent), The Guardian emphasized 
the loss of Coalition soldiers (18.8 percent). 
The majority of the coverage in 2011 in both newspapers revolved around the 
Coalition troops with some coverage of political Coalition figures and Iraqi civilians. 
However, none of the top five categories included critical war coverage. Therefore, the 
prominent message was simply around the Coalition troops returning home. 
 
H3: Both newspapers will include more frames depicting violence, destruction, 
and societal chaos of war in 2006; and the 2011 coverage will focus on the 
departing troops and include much less critical and graphic images of the war. 
In answering H3, both newspapers did include in 2006 a larger number of critical frames 
of violence, destruction, and the societal chaos from war, and provided a more sanitized 
or uncritical conclusion of the Iraq war in 2011. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION 
 
Revisiting the War Frames of Previous Scholarship 
This study set out to investigate how war frames changed over a span of eight 
years. In order to discuss how war frames changed it is important to revisit the findings of 
previous studies. Previous research of the Iraq invasion period of 2003 has revealed that 
military conflict was one of the most predominant war frames during the 2003 Iraq 
invasion. King and Lester (2005) found the top five categories found in U.S. newspapers 
for the 2003 Iraq invasion included: battlefield scenes, images of the home front, fighting 
scenes, portraits, and images of civilians. Concluding that over half of the images could 
be classified as battle images. 
Griffin (2004) found about half of all images printed in news magazines were of 
the arsenal, unengaged troops and political leaders. Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2009) 
analyzed print, television and online media coverage and found 77 percent of all images 
were of the arsenal/war machine frame. Fahmy and Kim (2008) compared the visual 
coverage of The New York Times and The Guardian during the Iraq invasion in 2003. The 
New York Times’ top categories included: Coalition troops; Iraqi casualties; Coalition 
political leaders; and Coalition troops with Iraqi civilians (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). The 
Guardian’s most predominant categories were: Iraqi casualties; allied troops; and images 
of looting (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) compared the 
websites of the New York Times and The Guardian during the 2003 Iraq invasion. The 
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top five categories for The New York Times was: violence of war; military conflict; 
rebuilding of Iraq; human interest; and prognostic frame (long term effects of war). For 
The Guardian the most predominant frames were: violence of war; military conflict; 
prognostic frame; rebuilding of Iraq; and anti-war protest (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 
2007). Both websites had similar war frames but The Guardian focused more on anti-war 
protests than The New York Times (Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). Overall, 
military activity/conflict was the most dominant frame across the 2003 Iraq invasion 
coverage. The visual representation of the 2003 Iraq invasion focused on the Coalition 
troops, the Coalition political leaders, and the Coalition arsenal. The prominent narrative 
was the progress towards Bagdad, which often erupted in violence and Iraqi casualties. 
 
Frequency, Photograph Size, and Placement, 2006, 2011 
The findings from this study revealed The New York Times was over three times 
more likely to publish Iraq war images over The Guardian in 2006 and 2011 (77.7 
percent compared to 22.3 percent). The United States deployed many more soldiers into 
Iraq than the United Kingdom and had a larger stake in the Iraq War — therefore that 
difference is representative in the media coverage for both countries. 
Under the category of image size The Guardian was much more likely to publish 
large images over The New York Times (19 percent compared to 3.4 percent). The 
majority of images in both newspapers were medium or small with medium being the 
predominant size photograph in both newspapers (55.3 percent of The New York Times 
images and 42.9 percent of The Guardian images). This may be because the Iraq War had 
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been going on for several years and therefore received less prominent placement in terms 
of size compared to other news stories. 
For photograph placement (the page the image was printed on in the publication), 
there were no statistically significant differences on photograph placement. However, The 
Guardian was slightly more likely to bury images of the Iraq War in the third section of 
their newspaper over The New York Times. Again, with the ongoing and long duration of 
the war, the Iraq War was no longer a new story. Updates of the Iraq War had to compete 
with turmoil in the Afghanistan war in 2006 and the Arab Spring in the 2011 coverage. 
 
The 2006 War Frames 
Three years after the invasion period, Iraq was on the brink of a civil war. A new 
permanent Iraqi government was in place, but it struggled against growing sectarian 
violence and anti-coalition attacks. At the same time, the Iraq Study group found the 
situation in Iraq to be deteriorating with no foreseeable end to the conflict and withdrawal 
of Coalition forces would further destabilize the region. 
The war frames that emerged in 2006 that were the same or similar to the 2003 
studies were the following: diagnostic frame, political figures, military 
conflict/developments, coalition troops, Iraqi military, Iraqi civilians, Iraqi 
prisoners/prisons, rebuilding of Iraq, violence/destruction of war, human cost of war 
(Coalition and Iraqi casualties), wounded (Coalition and Iraqis), protests (Coalition and 
Arab countries), and human interest stories. 
The diagnostic frame refers to images that represent the reasons for leading to 
war, including images of enemies and/or enemy weapons. From Dimitrova and Connolly-
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Ahern’s (2007) study 1.8 percent of images from both newspapers were labeled 
diagnostic. Fahmy and Kim (2008) found only 1.2 percent of the images collected from 
The Guardian and The New York Times to be images of Saddam. The amount of images 
in the diagnostic frame for this study in 2006 more than tripled from earlier studies with 
6.9 percent of all the images categorized as diagnostic, 6.3 percent from The New York 
Times and 8.7 percent from The Guardian. When comparing The New York Times and 
The Guardian, there were no statistically significant differences of published images 
between these newspapers. The majority of images in this category were of Saddam 
Hussein. At the end of 2006, the new Iraqi government found Saddam Hussein guilty of 
crimes against humanity after a yearlong trial in an Iraqi court. Saddam’s trial was highly 
publicized and the majority of these images were of Saddam during the trial and 
referencing war crimes that occurred decades before the Iraq invasion. The widely 
publicized trial is probably why these images increased from 2003 to 2006. 
Political figures from Coalition countries and Arab countries were classified for 
this study, including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, member of congress, 
high-ranking military officials, and other public officials (but do not include images of 
Saddam or other individuals clearly defined as enemies). From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) 
study of the Iraq invasion in 2003, 9.1 percent of images were of political and military 
leaders of Coalition forces from both newspapers. In comparing their study to this 
research that number doubles in 2006 with 19.6 percent of the images categorized as 
political Coalition figures. The majority of political Coalition figures were of the U.S. 
president or the British prime minister for this study. There were no statistical differences 
in comparing The New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 on the category of political 
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Coalition figures. Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study found 0.7 percent of political and 
military Arab figures represented in 2003. In comparing 2003 to this study for 2006, 
political Arab figures increased in 2006 to 5.6 percent of the coverage in both 
newspapers. However, when isolating for publication for this study for 2006, there was a 
significant difference in the 2006 representation of this category. The New York Times 
was much more likely to publish images of political Arab figures over The Guardian, 
with 7.1 percent of The New York Times’ coverage was of political Arab figures, whereas 
The Guardian did not publish any images under this category in 2006. 
Military activity/developments may include Coalition patrols, withdrawal, or 
change of military bases as well as military conflict (but does not include the 2011 
withdrawal). For Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 75.4 percent of 
images collected were of military conflict. In comparing their study to this research, this 
number dropped dramatically in 2006, with 8.4 percent of the images categorized under 
military activity/developments. In comparing this frame between the two newspapers for 
this study in 2006, there were no statistically significant differences between the amounts 
of images published. 
Coalition military troops are a visual presence of Coalition soldiers and are not 
already classified under wounded Coalition soldiers, human cost of war, or atrocities. 
From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study of 2003, 21.8 percent of images collected were of 
Coalition troops. In comparing their research the amount of images of Coalition troops 
decreases in 2006, with 13.7 percent of the images were categorized under Coalition 
military troops. When comparing The New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 for this 
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study there were no statistical differences for images published between the two 
newspapers. 
Under the category Iraqi police/military this denotes a visual presence of Iraqi 
police/military that are not already classified as human interest stories. From Fahmy and 
Kim’s (2008) study Iraqi military and police consisted of 1.4 percent of the images in 
2003. In comparing their study to this research, this number increases in 2006, with 4.0 
percent of the images classified under this category. In comparing Iraqi police/military 
between the two newspapers in 2006, there were no statistical differences in their visual 
representation. 
For the category of Iraqi civilians, this includes images of Iraqi civilians not 
already classified under human-interest stories, anti-war protest, or cheering/celebrating 
an event associated with the war. Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) category of “civilian life” in 
2003 was used for comparison with this study’s category of Iraqi civilians. In their 2003 
study of the Iraq invasion 21.0 percent of the images were of civilian life. This amount 
was similar to this study for 2006, where 20.6 percent of the images were categorized 
under Iraqi civilians. When comparing The New York Times and The Guardian in 2006 
there was a significant statistical difference between the two newspapers. The New York 
Times was over twice as likely to publish images of Iraqi civilians over The Guardian. 
23.4 percent of The New York Times’ coverage was of the Iraqi civilians category over 
10.1 percent of The Guardian’s coverage. 
The category of Iraqi prisoners/prisons does not include images of Saddam, and is 
a visual representation of Iraqi prisoners/prisons. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study 
2.3 percent of images were of Iraqi prisoners. This is similar to the amount of images 
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found in 2006, only 2.8 percent of the images were categorized under this Iraqi 
prisoners/prisons category, and there were no statistical differences between The New 
York Times and The Guardian.  
The rebuilding of Iraq frame shows how Coalition forces or Iraqis are involved in 
rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure through roads, bridges, or other facilities. For Dimitrova 
and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 61.4 percent of the images collected were of 
the rebuilding of Iraq frame. In comparing their study to this study in 2006, this amount 
dropped considerably to only 0.3 percent of all images being under this category. Only 
one image in 2006 was included in this category and was printed by The Guardian. With 
the small amount of images, there were no statistical differences between both 
newspapers for 2006. 
For the violence/destruction of war frame, these images may include fire, bullets, 
violence, visible bloodshed, and/or destruction of buildings or infrastructure. For 
Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 89.5 percent of images were 
classified as violence of war. In comparing their study, the amount of violent images 
dropped dramatically in 2006, with 9.7 percent of the images categorized under 
violence/destruction of war. When comparing both newspapers in 2006 there were no 
statistical differences between the amounts of images published between the two 
newspapers. 
The human cost of war frame includes images of Coalition soldiers or Iraqis. 
These images represent loss of life, which may be depicted through coffins, gravesites, 
military photographs of the deceased thorough portraits, and visible grieving family or 
loved ones. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 2003, 2.0 percent of images were of 
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Coalition military casualties. In comparing their study to this research in 2006 that 
amount increased to 5.0 percent of the images classified under human cost of war for 
Coalition soldiers. There was a statistical significant difference between both newspapers 
in 2006 for the human cost of war frame for Coalition soldiers. The Guardian was much 
more likely to publish images of the human cost of war frame for Coalition soldiers over 
The New York Times. In 2006, only 1.2 percent of all images for The New York Times 
were included under this category whereas 18.8 percent of The Guardian’s coverage for 
2006 was included in this war frame. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 2003, 3.0 
percent of images were of Iraqi casualties. In comparing their study to this research in 
2006, the amount of images classified as human cost of war for Iraqis tripled to 10.9 
percent of images for both newspapers. When comparing the amount of images in both 
newspapers in 2006 for human cost of war for Iraqis there were no statistical differences 
between the publications. 
The anti-war protest/anti- U.S. or U.K. demonstration (Coalition or Arab 
countries) includes images of one or more individuals protesting against the Iraq War or 
against the intervention of the invading forces. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 
2003, 2.4 percent of images were of anti-war protests in Arab/Muslim nations. This 
amount slightly decreases in this study for 2006 with 1.9 percent of the images 
categorized as anti-war protest from Arab countries. When comparing The New York 
Times and The Guardian in 2006 there were no statistically significant differences for 
images published under this category. From Fahmy and Kim’s (2008) study in 2003, 2.3 
percent of images were of anti-war protests in the U.S. or U.K. This number drops even 
more in this study of 2006 with 0.3 percent for 2006 of anti-war protests in Coalition 
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countries. Only one image was printed in 2006 and it was in The New York Times 
newspaper. The sample size for this category was small and there were no statistically 
significant differences between The New York Times and The Guardian for the anti-war 
protest war frame. 
The category of human-interest stories differentiated between Iraqi civilians, Iraqi 
military/police, Coalition soldiers, and Coalition civilians. These images emphasize the 
human participants in the event and include the names of these individuals in the captions 
or identified within the story and their personal experience is a major part of the 
newspaper article. From Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study in 2003, 57.9 
percent of images were categorized as human interest, however, whether the human 
interest story was about Coalition soldiers, Coalition civilians, Iraqi soldiers, or Iraqi 
civilians was not differentiated within their study. For this study in 2006, the total of 
human-interest stories of all categories amounts to 12.1 percent of all images. In 2006, 
4.7 percent of the images published were of human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians. In 
comparing The New York Times and The Guardian, there was a statistically significant 
difference in the amounts of images published within this category in 2006. The New 
York Times was six times more likely to publish human-interest story images of Iraqi 
civilians over The Guardian. In 2006, The New York Times published 6.0 percent of 
human-interest stories of Iraqi civilians, while The Guardian did not publish any images 
within this category. For human-interest stories of Iraqi police/military, only 0.3 percent 
of images were classified under this category. Only one image was printed within this 
category in 2006 and it was published in The New York Times. With such a small sample 
size for this category, there were no statistically significant differences for human-interest 
 81	  
stories for Iraqi military/police. In 2006, 3.4 percent of the images were categorized as 
human-interest stories for Coalition military for both newspapers. When comparing both 
newspapers for 2006 there were not statistically significant differences in the amount of 
human-interest stories published for Coalition military. In 2006, 3.7 percent of the images 
in both newspapers were of human interest stories for Coalition civilians. In comparing 
both newspapers there were no statistically significant differences for images published 
in 2006 under human-interest stories for Coalition civilians. Overall, The New York Times 
was more likely to publish human interest stories for all categories over The Guardian in 
2006, 13.9 percent of all The New York Times’ images were of human-interest stories, 
while only 5.8 percent of The Guardian’s coverage was of this category. 
The types of frames that emerged in 2006 that were distinctive from 2003 were 
the following: Saddam’s trial, Donald Rumsfeld exiting as Defense Secretary, celebrating 
an event associated with the war, societal chaos of war, atrocities, and/or scandals of war, 
wounded/disabled frame, and the Iraqi study group. 
In 2006 Saddam’s trial was highly publicized, the images in this category include 
images associated to the trial but do not include images of Saddam. These images often 
included visuals of the courtroom and the judge. In 2006, only 1.9 percent of the images 
published were included within this category. When comparing The New York Times and 
The Guardian there were no statistically significant differences for images published. 
Also, in 2006 Donald Rumsfeld lost political support as the Iraq War continued 
and he resigned at the end of 2006, therefore the category of Donald Rumsfeld’s exiting 
as Defense Secretary was added. These images were separated from the images of 
political Coalition figures because his resignation signaled a change in how the war 
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would be handled. In 2006, 3.7 percent of images were classified under this category. 
When comparing The New York Times and The Guardian there were no statistically 
significant differences for images published in this category between the two newspapers. 
Celebrating an event associated with the Iraq War (Coalition or Arab countries) 
include images cheering a development in the war. In 2006, 0.9 percent of images were 
categorized as celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition Countries. 
Interestingly, for celebrating an event associated with the Iraq War for Arab countries it 
is also 0.9 percent in 2006. When isolating for 2006 only, there were no statistically 
significant differences in the types of images published for celebrating an event 
associated with the war by Coalition or Arab countries. In 2006, the most celebrated 
event associated with the war was the verdict from Saddam’s trial where he was 
sentenced to death by hanging. 
The category of societal chaos of war, and/or bombings and insurgent activity was 
another new frame that emerged in 2006. In 2006, 13.1 percent of images were classified 
under the societal chaos of war frame for both newspapers. In comparing the 
publications, there was a significant statistical difference between The New York Times 
and The Guardian. The New York Times was much more likely to publish images of the 
societal chaos of war frame over The Guardian. In 2006, 15.1 percent of the New York 
Times’ images were of this war frame compared to 5.8 percent of The Guardian’s 
coverage. 
Atrocities and/or scandals of war were separated by Coalition military, Saddam’s 
regime, and the Iraqi government. These were actions defined as illegal, abuse, rape, 
and/or unnecessary torture. In 2006, 1.9 percent of the images were categorized as 
 83	  
atrocities of war committed by Coalition soldiers. Only 0.3 percent of images in 2006 
were classified under atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime. Also, in 2006 0.3 
percent of images were categorized as atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime. 
For the atrocities categories, no statistically significant differences for images published 
by The New York Times compared to The Guardian. 
The wounded/disabled war frame distinguishes between Coalition soldiers and 
Iraqis, these photographs may contain images of fresh wounds or fully healed injuries 
that have resulted in disfigurement or amputations. In 2006, 3.1 percent of the images 
were classified as wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers for both newspapers. When 
comparing The New York Times and The Guardian, no statistically significant differences 
existed between the images represented in this category. For wounded/disabled Iraqis, 
there were 1.9 percent of images included in this category in 2006. When comparing both 
newspapers for wounded/disabled Iraqis, there were no statistically significant 
differences between the amounts of images published. 
The Iraq study group frame was also a new category that emerged in 2006, this 
frame refers to a panel of individuals selected to examine the progress and ongoing 
situation of the Iraq War and to make recommendations on a future course of action. In 
2006, 3.1 percent of images were classified under this frame. When comparing The New 
York Times and The Guardian, there were no statistically significant differences between 
the amounts of images published. 
The findings for this study discovered the top five war frames for 2006 for both 
newspapers were the following: Iraqi Civilians (20.6 percent); political Coalition figures 
(19.6 percent); Coalition troops (13.7 percent); societal chaos of war (13.1 percent); and 
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human cost of Iraqi casualties (10.9 percent). When isolating for The New York Times 
and The Guardian by year, there were some variation in the top war frames. For The New 
York Times in 2006 the top five war frames were: Iraqi civilians (23.4 percent); political 
Coalition figures (18.7 percent); societal chaos of war (15.1 percent); coalition troops 
(13.9 percent); and human cost of war for Iraqi casualties (12.3 percent). For The 
Guardian in 2006 the top five categories were: political coalition figures (23.2 percent); 
human cost of war for Coalition casualties (18.8 percent); Coalition troops (13.0 percent); 
Iraqi civilians (10.1 percent); and with diagnostic and violence/destruction of war both at 
8.7 percent. 
While the 2003 invasion period has been described as the unstoppable war 
machine rolling into Baghdad (Griffin, 2004), the 2006 occupation period lacked a 
central theme or specific narrative. Instead, with the rising death and wounded rates of 
Iraqi civilians and Coalition solders along with rise of insurgent activities and bombings 
the 2006 period can best be described as chaotic and violent. With the exiting of Donald 
Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary and the emergence of the Iraq study group the future 
direction of the war is unclear and criticized. How the Iraq War had been handled is 
largely questioned at this time from U.S. and U.K. media in 2006. This was also reflected 
in the American public’s opinion over the war. By mid-November 2006, only 41 percent 
of Americans believed going to war in Iraq was the right decision and over 51 percent 
believing it was the wrong decision (Pew Research Center, 2013). In the U.K. in March 
2006, 33 percent of the British people believed going to Iraq was the right decision over 
57 percent believing it was the wrong decision (YouGov, 2013). However, amid the large 
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increase in insurgent activity and casualty rates at the end of 2006 — the only clear 
message is that the Iraq War is too unstable for the Coalition troops to withdrawal. 
 
The 2011 War Frames 
Only one war frame emerged in 2011 that was distinctive from 2006, this was the 
coalition troop withdraw frame. These images include packing to leave Iraq, traveling out 
of Iraq, and arriving in the U.S. after leaving Iraq. In 2011, 25.0 percent of all images in 
both newspapers were of this frame. When comparing The New York Times and The 
Guardian for all of the war frames there were no statistically significant differences for 
images published between both newspapers. The types of frames that disappeared in the 
2011 coverage from the 2006 coverage were the following: Saddam’s trial; Rumsfeld 
exiting as Defense Secretary; human cost of war for Coalition casualties; wounded Iraqis; 
anti-war protests from Arab countries; anti-war protests from Coalition countries; human-
interest stories of Iraq military; human-interest stories of Coalition civilians; and 
atrocities by Saddam’s regime. 
Several war frames decreased from 2006 to 2011 as the visual coverage during 
this time became centralized around the departing Coalition soldiers. These frames 
included, the diagnostic frame, political coalition figures, military activity/developments, 
Iraqi civilians, violence/destruction of war, human cost of war for Iraqi casualties, 
wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers, and the societal chaos of war frame. 
For the diagnostic frame in 2011, there was one image of Saddam printed by The 
Guardian. This represented 1.8 percent of the 56-sample size for the images collected in 
2011. The diagnostic frame had decreased considerably as compared to 2006 when it was 
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6.9 percent. In 2011 images of political Coalition figures was still a prominent frame at 
14.3 percent of the images from both newspapers. This had decreased a few percentage 
points from 2006 when the percentage of political Coalition figures was at 19.6 percent. 
For the military activity/development frame in 2011, 5.4 percent of images published 
were coded under this frame. The military activity frame decreased a few percentage 
points from 8.4 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2011. The visual representation of Iraqi 
civilians declined in 2011, but was still a major war category. In 2006, 20.6 percent of 
images were classified as Iraqi civilians compared to 14.3 percent in 2011. The 
violence/destruction of war frame decreased in 2011. In 2006, 9.7 percent of images were 
classified under violence/destruction of war, compared to only 1.8 percent in 2011. 
The human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame decreased in 2011. In 2006, 10.9 
percent of images were categorized under human cost of war for Iraqi casualties 
compared to 5.4 in 2011. The amount of wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers decreased 
in 2011. In 2006, 3.1 percent of images were categorized as wounded/disabled Coalition 
soldiers compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. Images classified under societal chaos of war, 
and/or bombings and insurgent activity frame dropped considerably from 2006 to 2011. 
In 2006, 13.1 percent of images were categorized as societal chaos of war, compared to 
3.6 percent in 2011. 
While many war frames disappeared or declined from 2006 to 2011, there were 
some that increased. These included: political Arab figures; Coalition military troops; 
Iraqi police/military; rebuilding of Iraq frame; celebrating an event associated with the 
war; human interest stories for Iraqi civilians; human interest stories for Coalition 
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military; atrocities committed by Coalition soldiers; and atrocities committed by the Iraqi 
regime. 
For political Arab figures in 2011, 8.9 percent of the images were included in this 
category. The percentage of political Arab figures rose from 2006 with 5.6 percent of the 
images to 8.9 percent. Also, while in 2006 The Guardian did not publish any images in 
this category, in 2011 it represented 13.3 percent of the images relating to the Iraq War. 
The Coalition military troops frame more than doubled in 2011. The Coalition military 
troops frame was a very prominent frame in 2006 at 13.7 percent of images then 
increased considerably to 37.5 percent of the images collected in 2011. The Iraqi 
police/military frame rose slightly in 2011, from 4.0 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent. For 
the category of Iraqi prisoners/prisons this war frame rose in 2011. In 2006, 2.8 percent 
of images were classified as Iraqi prisoners/prisons and increased to 8.9 percent in 2011. 
The rebuilding of Iraq frame increased slightly in 2011. In 2006, only 0.3 percent of 
images were classified under this category compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. 
Celebrating an event associated with the war by Coalition and Arab countries both 
rose in 2011. In 2006, 0.9 percent of images were categorized under celebrating an event 
associated with the war by Coalition countries compared to 5.4 percent in 2011. Also, in 
2006, 0.9 percent of images were classified as celebrating an event associated with the 
war from Arab countries compared to 1.8 percent in 2011. In both categories, the event 
being celebrated was the withdrawal of Coalition soldiers from Iraq. 
Under the category of human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians, the percentage of 
images published rose from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 4.7 percent of images were classified 
under human-interest stories for Iraqi civilians compared to 7.1 percent in 2011. The 
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percent of human-interest stories for Coalition military rose from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 
3.4 percent of images were classified as human interest stories for Coalition military 
compared to 10.7 percent in 2011. 
For the category of atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by Coalition 
soldiers the percentage of these images rose in 2011. In 2006, 1.9 percent of images were 
classified as atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by Coalition soldiers compared 
to 8.9 percent in 2011. For the category of atrocities and/or scandals of war committed by 
the Iraqi regime, the percentage of these images rose slightly from 2006 to 2011. In 2006, 
0.3 percent of the images were classified as atrocities and/or scandals of war compared to 
1.8 percent in 2011. 
The five most representative categories for 2011 for both newspapers were: 
returning Coalition soldiers (25 percent); Coalition troops (17.2 percent); political 
Coalition figures (14.3 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.3 percent); and human interest stories 
of Coalition soldiers (10.7 percent). The top five categories for 2011 for The New York 
Times was: Coalition troops (36.6 percent); returning Coalition soldiers (26.8 percent); 
political Coalition figures (17.1 percent); Iraqi civilians (14.6 percent); and human 
interest stories of Iraqi civilians (9.8 percent). For The Guardian for 2011 the top 
categories were: Coalition troops (40.0 percent); human interest stories of Coalition 
military (20.0 percent); atrocities by Coalition Soldiers (20.0 percent); and returning 
Coalition soldiers (20.0 percent). Then following categories were all at 13.3 percent for 
The Guardian in 2011: political Arab figures, military conflict/developments, Iraqi 
civilians, Iraqi prisoners/prisons, and celebrating Coalition countries. 
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The central narrative around the 2011 coverage was the departure of Coalition 
soldiers and the long awaited official end to the conflict. The primary focus was of the 
Coalition troops and their personal stories and preparation in leaving Iraq. During this 
time, more emphasis was put on the representation of political Arab figures and the Iraqi 
military/police in maintaining control in Iraq. Also, images of Iraqi civilians transitioning 
to normal life and celebrating the end of the Iraq war were represented in both 
publications. During this time both The New York Times and The Guardian published 
stories about continued insurgent activity and bombings resulting in death and 
destruction, however, photographs rarely accompanied these articles. 
During the last month leading up to the withdrawal of Coalition troops in Iraq, 
public approval of the war slightly increased to 48 percent believing it was the right 
decision, with more than 46 percent believing it was the wrong decision (Pew Research 
Center, 2013). For the U.K., 2011 public opinion data was not available, however by 
2013, only 27 percent of the British public believed going to war was the right decision 
(YouGov, 2013). 
In comparing the war frames, it was expected for the representation of military 
activity/development to dramatically decrease from 2003 to 2006 and 2011. However, it 
was surprising that the rebuilding of Iraq frame was much more significant in 2003 over 
2006 and 2011. In addition, when the rebuilding of Iraq frame appeared in the research, it 
was often connected with a misuse of funds and associated with unsuccessful projects in 
Iraq. 
Interesting war frames that emerged in 2006 included the Iraq study group and 
societal chaos of war. The 2003 narrative that emphasized the progress the Coalition 
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forces made no longer existed in 2006. The new focus in 2006 was how badly the Iraq 
War had been handled and the instability of the war at that time. Also, since Iraq was so 
unstable with widespread insurgent activity, the one clear message was that the Coalition 
forces could not abandon Iraq during this time. Therefore, while the former actions of the 
Bush administration were questioned and criticized, the continual presence of the 
Coalition forces within the country was a necessity. 
 
Discussion 
During the invasion period, both The New York Times and The Guardian focused 
heavily on the Coalition military activity, the search for weapons, and the successes of 
securing Iraqi cities including Baghdad. This research investigated how the press visually 
represented an unpopular and largely controversial war in the U.S. and British presses. 
While both The New York Times and The Guardian visually portrayed the end of the 
2011 conflict similarly, the tumultuous 2006 period was represented differently in both 
newspapers. After the Coalition forces did not find weapons of mass destruction, which 
were believed to pose a threat to the allied nations (and was the primary reason for 
invading Iraq), media coverage surrounding the military action in Iraq became largely 
criticized. Three years after the invasion period, Iraq was on the brink of a civil war. The 
situation in Iraq had largely deteriorated with widespread insurgent activity and Iraqi 
civilian deaths — the end of the war was nowhere in sight because withdrawal of 
Coalition forces would further destabilize the region. Eight years after the Iraq War began 
Coalition forces withdrew from Iraq, while insurgent activity still existed — the new 
Iraqi government was more secure. 
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Over a decade after the war in Iraq began, the American and British public is still 
divided over the decision to use military force in that country. The Pew Research center 
tracked the American public’s opinion over whether using military force in Iraq was the 
right or wrong decision from 2003 until 2013. At the start of the Iraq War in mid-March, 
71 percent of Americans believed using military force was the right decision, by the end 
of the official invasion period this number had dropped slightly to 69 percent (Pew 
Research Center, 2013). In the U.K. only 50 percent believed going to war was the right 
decision in March of 2003, with that slightly increasing to 54 percent by early April of 
2003 (YouGov, 2013). A decade after the war began 41 percent of Americans believe 
going to war with Iraq was the right decision, 44 percent believe it was the wrong 
decision, and 14 percent responded that they did not know (or refused to answer). By 
2013, only 27 percent of the British people believed going to war with Iraq was the right 
decision over 53 percent believing it was the wrong decision (and 20 percent responded 
they did not know) (YouGov, 2013). Surprisingly in 2013, more American and British 
respondents were undecided over whether going to war was the right decision or not over 
all other years polled (Pew Research Center, 2013; YouGov, 2013). To a large extent this 
dis-enthrallment with U.S. and U.K. objectives can be attributed to the coverage of the 
war from the respective nation’s media. 
Analyzing visual images of recent wars therefore is an important area of study in 
understanding complex relationships between media, political administrations, and the 
public’s knowledge of war. In the United States, the Persian Gulf War is generally cited 
as the Pentagon’s response to the media coverage of the Vietnam War. Danny Schechter, 
a U.S. based filmmaker and former TV network producer and journalist has been 
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outspoken in his criticisms of domestic media to hold U.S. officials accountable for the 
failures of the Iraq War. Schechter argues that many in the Pentagon believe the media 
coverage of the Vietnam War ultimately led to the loss of that war (Schechter, 2011). 
Therefore, as a result, “large amounts of money and manpower” have been invested in 
influencing the press in order to mitigate negative media coverage of wars after Vietnam 
(Schechter, 2011, p. 313). 
Rachel Maddow, an American television host, political commentator, and author, 
addressed war censorship and its affects as “insulating the public from not only the cost 
of war but sometimes even the knowledge that it’s happening — war making has become 
almost an autonomous function of the American state” (Maddow, 2012, pp. 202-203). 
The Bush administration from 2003 to 2008 “exercised a tight hold on imagery about the 
cost of the wars” news photographers were banned from the transfer ceremonies for flag-
draped caskets and the president and vice president did not attend military funerals 
(Maddow, 2012, pp. 245). The government actively prevented funeral coverage even 
when reporters were invited by the families, also by requiring news agencies to get 
signed consent forms from photographed wounded soldiers — the Pentagon further 
limited the press (Maddow, 2012). Under President Obama’s administration from 2008 to 
present, Obama has taken a more aggressive stance on preventing whistleblowers since 
the Nixon administration (McVeigh, 2013). Prosecuting journalists under the Espionage 
Act has severely hindered the release of information and led to a chilling effect on the 
press (McVeigh, 2013). Therefore, media coverage of current wars is affected by even 
more restrictive measures than under the Bush administration. 
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In addition, with continued media consolidation of news organizations and the 
corporatization of TV news these changes have made “external manipulation easier” 
(Schechter, 2011, p. 314). Schechter (2011) has argued that the war was not the product 
of only one person — “it took powerful institutions — a military-industrial-media 
complex — to achieve the desired outcome” (Schechter, 2011, p. 314). Fuchs (2011) 
discusses how the competition for Iraq War coverage in 2003 between major channels as 
FOX, CNN, ABC, CBS, and MSNBC “did not automatically result in a more democratic 
and pluralistic type of coverage” but instead resulted in “mass one-dimensional 
coverage” (Fuchs, 2011, p. 57). 
The Iraq invasion has been described as a conflict reduced to “a fight between the 
evil-doer Saddam Hussein and the forces of civilization” (Schechter, 2011, p. 308). After 
the invasion of Iraq, American viewers began to seek alternative sources in other 
countries including the BBC and British newspaper websites (Schechter, 2011). The 
Guardian as well as the Independent, and the Daily Mirror “offered a counter-narrative 
no mainstream media outlet did the same” (Schechter, 2011, p. 307). Dahr Jamail a well-
known journalist that reported from Iraq discussed how the reporting of the The New 
York Times represented the trend of the entire mainstream media (Jamail, 2011, p. 292). 
Therefore, analyzing The Guardian and The New York Times following the Iraq invasion 
period is an important area of study and comparison. 
Another important aspect of the Iraq War was the use of embedded reporters, who 
first gained notoriety as war correspondents in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While 
embedded journalists in 2003 were subject to less restrictive practices than those in 1991 
were, many scholars have argued because the embedded reporters are so dependent on 
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the soldiers for safety, they would be more likely to identify with them and report stories 
that are more favorable about the soldiers and the war (King & Lester, 2005). King and 
Lester (2005) found similar visual war frames between the 1991 Persian Gulf and 2003 
Iraq War. 
Scholars have argued that embedded journalism is an “integrative strategy of 
media self-censorship” which dissolves the distance between reporter and military 
(Fuchs, 2011, p. 56). During the Iraq War embed program, more than 600 reporters were 
stationed with British and U.S. troops from the front and had to sign an agreement 
defining “ground rules,” which set strict regulations for coverage (Fuchs, 2011, p. 56). 
For example, an embedded journalist was fired for posting images of the remains of 
American soldiers after a suicide bombing (Jamail, 2011). 
While a small percentage of all images collected in 2006 and 2011 were of 
atrocities or scandals by Coalition soldiers (2.9 percent), Jamail (2011) an Iraq War 
reporter argues this number could have been much larger. Jamail (2011) discussed how 
there was a misrepresentation of news by journalists during Fallujah, and Abu Hanifa: 
I have found and reported that in order to bring freedom to Fallujah, the “US 
troops have sprayed chemical and nerve gases on resistance fighters” and that 
“residents have been further burnt beyond treatment by poisonous gases.” I had 
evidence too since the US had admitted having used napalm, an internationally 
banned weapon, in Iraq during the initial invasion of the country. I had eyewitness 
accounts to back my claims. (Jamail, 2011, p. 294) 
Jamail (2011) reported that some of these illegal weapons used by the U.S. accidentally 
killed American soldiers, and argues “a few simple interviews conducted with Iraqis and 
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some readily available photographs and video can drastically correct the glaring errors in 
the Western media’s representations of the occupation” (p. 300). Within crisis 
management, there are five most commonly used propaganda tactics, which include: 
“delay, distract, discredit, spotlight, and scapegoat” which have been largely used by the 
United States in their media coverage of the Iraq War (Jamail, 2011, p. 300). 
There were a number of limitations of the study. First, when utilizing microfilm to 
analyze images, the image quality is deteriorated from the original form. The images are 
in black and white instead of color, and several of the microfilm images were dark and 
fine image details were lost. The largest obstacle this study faced involved ensuring inter-
coder reliability that becomes more difficult when latent content is coded. Examples of 
manifest conflict would be images of Coalition soldiers or Iraqi civilians, while latent 
content is less explicit like violence/destruction and societal chaos of war. Also, it was 
anticipated that coding reliability might become difficult because some photographs may 
be in more than one war frame, and the intercoder may not be as diligent in ensuring that 
all frames are coded. However, with pilot coding training and testing — this study 
worked to mitigate those problems. 
Initially this study intended to classify images of children in the Iraq War 
coverage. Often images of children become persuasive messages either supporting or 
criticizing the war efforts. Thorne (2003) explained the nature of these images and how 
they “personify injustice” because “children signify vulnerability, dependence and 
innocence” (p. 261). However, with only a few images collected from both newspapers, 
this category was not utilized within the study. 
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After conducting the study, images of the human cost of war would be a ripe area 
for future research. Within this study, there were several ways how the loss of life of 
Coalition soldiers and Iraqis were portrayed. The human cost of war for Coalition 
casualties was most often represented by portrait images of the deceased soldiers, with 
some flag draped caskets. Conversely, the images of human cost of war for the Iraqis 
were much more graphic, with the most common representation of bodies covered by a 
sheet of cloth—and sometimes with an arm or other body part visible. 
As we enter a new era of long-standing wars, analyzing ongoing conflict is a very 
important area for future research. This study found there are major differences between 
media coverage of invasion periods over continuing conflict. Whether going to war with 
Iraq was the right decision is still a largely debated topic by the American and British 
public. This is largely reflective in how the media coverage of The New York Times and 
The Guardian evolved over time. However, there were major differences in how these 
newspapers covered the 2006 occupation period in terms of political Arab figures, Iraqi 
civilians, human cost of war of Coalition soldiers, and human-interest stories about Iraqi 
civilians, and societal chaos of war. In comparison to The Guardian in 2006, The New 
York Times underrepresented the amount of Coalition military deaths, and instead 
focused on political Arab figures within the new Iraqi government and the plight of the 
Iraqi civilians during this period of widespread insurgent activity resulting in massive 
Iraqi casualties. Over a decade after the Iraq War began, more American and British 
people are undecided over whether using military force was the right decision. 
Historically, the public should be more informed about the facts and issues surrounding 
military conflict and more decisive as further details are revealed over time through 
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media outlets. This suggests a failure by the U.S. and U.K. media in providing a 
comprehensive representation of the Iraq War to allow individuals to come to definitive 
decisions about the actions of their elected officials in dealing with foreign policy. What 
the Iraq War should have taught us is that a critical investigative press is essential in 
preventing misrepresented and unnecessary wars. However, with shrinking media 
budgets for investigative reporting, and stricter government control over what the press 
can release — this lesson will not be learned in the foreseeable future. 
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APPENDIX I 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Table 1: Newspapers according to publication year 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .771a 1 .380   
Continuity Correctionb .495 1 .482   
Likelihood Ratio .743 1 .389   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .387 .237 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .769 1 .381 
  
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 2: Photograph size published and newspaper 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.226a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 20.623 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.394 1 .011 
N of Valid Cases 377   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.79. 
 
 
Table 3: Newspaper and page images of the Iraq War were published 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.710a 2 .258 
Likelihood Ratio 2.674 2 .263 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.262 1 .133 
N of Valid Cases 377   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.24. 
 
 
Table 4: Photograph placement and size 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.925a 4 .042 
Likelihood Ratio 12.418 4 .014 
Linear-by-Linear Association .966 1 .326 
N of Valid Cases 377   
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.55. 
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Table 5.1: Newspaper and diagnostic frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .940a 1 .332   
Continuity Correctionb .506 1 .477   
Likelihood Ratio .877 1 .349   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .312 .232 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.938 1 .333   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.12. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 5.2: Newspaper and diagnostic frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .467a 1 .494   
Continuity Correctionb .172 1 .678   
Likelihood Ratio .443 1 .506   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .590 .326 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.466 1 .495   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.73. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 5.3: Diagnostic frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.783a 1 .095   
Continuity Correctionb .280 1 .597   
Likelihood Ratio 2.685 1 .101   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .268 .268 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.733 1 .098   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 6: Saddam trial frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.748a 1 .186   
Continuity Correctionb .685 1 .408   
Likelihood Ratio 3.053 1 .081   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .345 .218 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.743 1 .187   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 7.2: Political coalition category for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .707a 1 .400   
Continuity Correctionb .449 1 .503   
Likelihood Ratio .686 1 .408   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .397 .248 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.705 1 .401   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.54. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Political coalition category for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Table 7.1: Political coalition category, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .140a 1 .709   
Continuity Correctionb .046 1 .829   
Likelihood Ratio .138 1 .710   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .752 .408 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.139 1 .709   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.82. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Pearson Chi-Square .971a 1 .324   
Continuity Correctionb .307 1 .579   
Likelihood Ratio 1.107 1 .293   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .428 .305 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.954 1 .329   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.14. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 8.1: Political Arab category, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.611a 1 .106   
Continuity Correctionb 1.842 1 .175   
Likelihood Ratio 3.160 1 .075   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .126 .080 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.604 1 .107   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.12. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 8.2: Political Arab category for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.221a 1 .022   
Continuity Correctionb 3.959 1 .047   
Likelihood Ratio 9.001 1 .003   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .017 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.205 1 .023   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.87. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 8.3: Political Arab category for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .489a 1 .484   
Continuity Correctionb .029 1 .865   
Likelihood Ratio .454 1 .501   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .602 .406 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.480 1 .488   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 9: Donald Rumsfeld’s exiting as defense secretary in 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.035a 1 .309   
Continuity Correctionb .435 1 .510   
Likelihood Ratio .933 1 .334   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .295 .244 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.032 1 .310   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.58. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 10.1: Military activity frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .098a 1 .754   
Continuity Correctionb .007 1 .933   
Likelihood Ratio .100 1 .752   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .481 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.098 1 .755   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.68. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 10.2: Military activity frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .780a 1 .377   
Continuity Correctionb .407 1 .523   
Likelihood Ratio .844 1 .358   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .470 .270 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.777 1 .378   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 10.3: Military activity frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.571a 1 .109   
Continuity Correctionb .871 1 .351   
Likelihood Ratio 2.214 1 .137   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .172 .172 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.525 1 .112   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 11.1: Coalition military troops category, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .029a 1 .865   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 .995   
Likelihood Ratio .029 1 .866   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .871 .490 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.029 1 .866   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 11.2: Coalition military troops category for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .033a 1 .856   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .033 1 .856   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .518 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.033 1 .857   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.46. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 11.3: Coalition military troops category for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .055a 1 .815   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .054 1 .816   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .526 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.054 1 .817   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 12.1: Iraqi police/military category, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .923a 1 .337   
Continuity Correctionb .428 1 .513   
Likelihood Ratio 1.046 1 .306   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .540 .268 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.921 1 .337   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 12.2: Iraqi police/military category for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.530a 1 .216   
Continuity Correctionb .796 1 .372   
Likelihood Ratio 1.894 1 .169   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .313 .190 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.525 1 .217   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.79. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 12.3: Iraqi police/military category for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .069a 1 .792   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .066 1 .797   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .615 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.068 1 .794   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 13.1: Iraqi civilians category, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.444a 1 .020   
Continuity Correctionb 4.742 1 .029   
Likelihood Ratio 6.056 1 .014   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .019 .012 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.430 1 .020   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.49. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 13.2: Iraqi civilians category for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.838a 1 .016   
Continuity Correctionb 5.054 1 .025   
Likelihood Ratio 6.603 1 .010   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .018 .009 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.820 1 .016   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.19. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 13.3: Iraqi civilians category for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .015a 1 .902   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .015 1 .901   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .637 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.015 1 .903   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.14. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 14.1: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category , 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .006a 1 .938   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .006 1 .937   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .619 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.006 1 .938   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.12. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 14.2: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .592a 1 .442   
Continuity Correctionb .128 1 .721   
Likelihood Ratio .684 1 .408   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .690 .389 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.590 1 .442   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.93. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 14.3: Iraqi prisoners/prisons category for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .489a 1 .484   
Continuity Correctionb .029 1 .865   
Likelihood Ratio .454 1 .501   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .602 .406 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.480 1 .488   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 15.1: Rebuilding of Iraq frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .892a 1 .345   
Continuity Correctionb .009 1 .926   
Likelihood Ratio .739 1 .390   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .396 .396 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.890 1 .346   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 15.2: Rebuilding of Iraq frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.664a 1 .056   
Continuity Correctionb .483 1 .487   
Likelihood Ratio 3.086 1 .079   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .215 .215 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.652 1 .056   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 15.3: Rebuilding of Iraq frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .373a 1 .542   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .732 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.366 1 .545   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 16.1: Violence/destruction of war frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .003a 1 .954   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .003 1 .954   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .578 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.003 1 .954   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 16.2: Violence/destruction of war frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .093a 1 .760   
Continuity Correctionb .006 1 .940   
Likelihood Ratio .095 1 .758   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .484 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.093 1 .761   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.66. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 16.3: Violence/destruction of war frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.783a 1 .095   
Continuity Correctionb .280 1 .597   
Likelihood Ratio 2.685 1 .101   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .268 .268 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.733 1 .098   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 17.1: Human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.553a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 30.091 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 26.574 1 .000   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
33.464 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 17.2: Human cost of war for Coalition soldiers frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.631a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 32.002 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 27.825 1 .000   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
35.520 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.44. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 18.1: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.031a 1 .154   
Continuity Correctionb 1.488 1 .223   
Likelihood Ratio 2.261 1 .133   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .216 .108 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.026 1 .155   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.47. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 18.2: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.359a 1 .125   
Continuity Correctionb 1.737 1 .188   
Likelihood Ratio 2.680 1 .102   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .189 .089 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.352 1 .125   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.52. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 18.3: Human cost of war for Iraqi casualties frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .069a 1 .792   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .066 1 .797   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .615 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.068 1 .794   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 19.1: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .373a 1 .542   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .732 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.366 1 .545   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 19.2: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .442a 1 .506   
Continuity Correctionb .075 1 .784   
Likelihood Ratio .409 1 .523   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .453 .367 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.441 1 .507   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.15. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 19.3: Wounded/disabled Coalition soldiers frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .373a 1 .542   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .732 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.366 1 .545   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 20.1: Wounded/disabled Iraqis frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .430a 1 .512   
Continuity Correctionb .026 1 .872   
Likelihood Ratio .391 1 .532   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .619 .401 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.429 1 .513   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 20.2: Wounded/disabled Iraqis frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .508a 1 .476   
Continuity Correctionb .045 1 .833   
Likelihood Ratio .457 1 .499   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .613 .382 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.506 1 .477   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.29. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 21.1: Anti-war protest frame from Arab countries, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .287a 1 .592   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .505 1 .477   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .777 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.287 1 .592   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 21.2: Anti-war protest frame from Arab countries for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .212a 1 .645   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .198 1 .656   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .646 .465 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.212 1 .645   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 22.1: Anti-war protest frame from Coalition countries, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .287a 1 .592   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .505 1 .477   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .777 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.287 1 .592   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 22.2: Anti-war protest frame from Coalition countries for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .275a 1 .600   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .485 1 .486   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .785 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.274 1 .601   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 23.1: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.936a 1 .008   
Continuity Correctionb 4.576 1 .032   
Likelihood Ratio 5.493 1 .019   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .024 .024 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.918 1 .009   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 23.2: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.662a 1 .056   
Continuity Correctionb 1.458 1 .227   
Likelihood Ratio 2.849 1 .091   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .118 .118 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.650 1 .056   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 23.3: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Coalition countries for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.571a 1 .109   
Continuity Correctionb .871 1 .351   
Likelihood Ratio 2.214 1 .137   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .172 .172 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.525 1 .112   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
	  
	  
Table 24.1: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries , 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .017a 1 .895   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .017 1 .897   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .637 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.017 1 .896   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .89. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 24.2: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .251a 1 .616   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .226 1 .635   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .517 .517 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.251 1 .617   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 24.3: Celebrating an event associated with the war frame from Arab countries for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .373a 1 .542   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .732 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.366 1 .545   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 25.1: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.736a 1 .017   
Continuity Correctionb 4.461 1 .035   
Likelihood Ratio 9.864 1 .002   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .010 .007 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.721 1 .017   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.23. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 25.2: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.308a 1 .038   
Continuity Correctionb 3.076 1 .079   
Likelihood Ratio 7.459 1 .006   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .048 .024 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.295 1 .038   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 25.3: Human interest stories for Iraqi civilians frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.576a 1 .209   
Continuity Correctionb .448 1 .503   
Likelihood Ratio 2.605 1 .107   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .565 .276 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.548 1 .213   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.07. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 26.1: Human interest stories for Iraqi military frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .287a 1 .592   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .505 1 .477   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .777 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.287 1 .592   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 26.2: Human interest stories for Iraqi military frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .275a 1 .600   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .485 1 .486   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .785 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.274 1 .601   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 27.1: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .016a 1 .899   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .016 1 .900   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .548 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.016 1 .899   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.79. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 27.2: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.039a 1 .308   
Continuity Correctionb .417 1 .518   
Likelihood Ratio 1.248 1 .264   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .468 .275 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.035 1 .309   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 27.3: Human interest stories for Coalition military frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.847a 1 .174   
Continuity Correctionb .759 1 .384   
Likelihood Ratio 1.659 1 .198   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .326 .188 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.814 1 .178   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.61. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 28.1: Human interest stories for Coalition civilians frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .053a 1 .818   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .052 1 .820   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .734 .523 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.053 1 .818   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 28.2: Human interest stories for Coalition civilians frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .091a 1 .763   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .088 1 .767   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .725 .496 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.090 1 .764   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.58. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 29.1: Societal chaos of war frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.005a 1 .025   
Continuity Correctionb 4.180 1 .041   
Likelihood Ratio 5.943 1 .015   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .032 .015 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.992 1 .025   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 29.2: Societal chaos of war frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.104a 1 .043   
Continuity Correctionb 3.328 1 .068   
Likelihood Ratio 4.801 1 .028   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .045 .028 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.091 1 .043   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.03. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 29.3: Societal chaos of war frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .759a 1 .384   
Continuity Correctionb .003 1 .954   
Likelihood Ratio 1.274 1 .259   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .532 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.745 1 .388   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .54. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 30.1: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.514a 1 .061   
Continuity Correctionb 2.270 1 .132   
Likelihood Ratio 2.984 1 .084   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .073 .073 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.504 1 .061   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 30.2: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .508a 1 .476   
Continuity Correctionb .045 1 .833   
Likelihood Ratio .457 1 .499   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .613 .382 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.506 1 .477   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.29. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 30.3: Atrocities of war committed by Coalition military frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.088a 1 .079   
Continuity Correctionb 1.509 1 .219   
Likelihood Ratio 2.704 1 .100   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .113 .113 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.033 1 .082   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.34. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 31.1: Atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .287a 1 .592   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .505 1 .477   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .777 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.287 1 .592   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 31.2: Atrocities of war committed by Saddam’s regime frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .275a 1 .600   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .485 1 .486   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .785 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.274 1 .601   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 32.1: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .576a 1 .448   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 1.011 1 .315   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .604 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.575 1 .448   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 32.2: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .275a 1 .600   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .485 1 .486   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .785 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.274 1 .601   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 32.3: Atrocities of war committed by the Iraqi regime frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .373a 1 .542   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .732 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.366 1 .545   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 33: Iraq Study group frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .808a 1 .369   
Continuity Correctionb .258 1 .611   
Likelihood Ratio .954 1 .329   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .696 .328 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.806 1 .369   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.15. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 34: Coalition troop withdrawal frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .273a 1 .601   
Continuity Correctionb .030 1 .862   
Likelihood Ratio .282 1 .595   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .736 .442 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.268 1 .604   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.75. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Table 35.1: Other frame, 2006 and 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.392a 1 .238   
Continuity Correctionb .685 1 .408   
Likelihood Ratio 1.708 1 .191   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .478 .211 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.389 1 .239   
N of Valid Cases 377     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.67. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 35.2: Other frame for 2006 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.039a 1 .308   
Continuity Correctionb .417 1 .518   
Likelihood Ratio 1.248 1 .264   
Fisher’s Exact Test    .468 .275 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.035 1 .309   
N of Valid Cases 321     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Table 35.3: Other frame for 2011 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .373a 1 .542   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher’s Exact Test    1.000 .732 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.366 1 .545   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .27. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Part-Time Instructor, UNLV: JOUR 202 Electronic Media Production Course, Fall 2013 
• Developed weekly lesson plans that parallel course objectives, while training a 
graduate teaching assistant 
• Instructed and graded students on operating field video cameras and basic post-
production editing 
• Promoted to part-time instructor after maintaining a graduate teaching assistant 
position for this course during Fall 2012 and Spring 2013 
Graduate Teaching Assistant, UNLV: JOUR 332 Media Buying and Selling, Fall 2011               
• Formulated lesson plans and learning material for lectures; instructed students on 
print, broadcast, and online media buying and selling methodologies 
• Recruited experts in radio and TV broadcasting for guest lectures from the 
Nevada Broadcasting Association 
